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1. PREFACE 
After two decades of antagonism and hostile relations the Republic 
of Korea (hereinafter referred to as ROK) and Japan came to establish 
amicable diplomatic relations on June 22, 1965. 
The complexity of the issues and the negotiations between the 
two countries is reflected by the seven formal conferences, not to 
mention numerous other informal contacts and talks, t~at took place 
during the fourteen intervening years and by the number of documents 
signed by both countries. Besides the Treaty on Basic Relations, (1) 
the important agreements that required satisfaction were the Agreement 
on Fisheries, the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning 
Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on the 
Legal Status and Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea 
residing in Japan, and the Agreement on Art Objects and Cultural 
Cooperation. In addition to these agreements, twenty other documents 
were signed on the same date, on June 22, 1965. 
The preliminary talks that opened in October, 1951, were the first 
official contact between the two countries after the defeat of Japan. 
The talks were urged and arranged by General Douglas MacArthur, the 
Supreme CornManrler for Allied Powers (~CAP), after the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty with Japan had been signed but before it took legal effect 
on April 18, 1952. Both sides agreed to place the following issues on 
the Rgenda: the legal status and treatment of Koreans residing in 
Japan and the questions of title to the Vessels in Korea harbours at 
(1) Kirn Yong-Shik's Explanation in Daehan Mi nguk Jongbu (Government of 
ROK), Hanil Hoedarn Paekso (White paper on the ROK-Japan Tal ks) (Seoul, 
Korea 1965) p. 191. 
The words "basic relations" and "Treaty on Basic Relations" were coined 
by the Koreans. The Treaty on ciasic Relations is, in reality, a treaty 
of friendship and trade. The ROK did not want to use the word "friend-
ship" in fear of a possible reaction by the Koreans, who were not really 
friend 1 y tow a r d the Ja pa..., e s e • (AW UBRART 
VICTCf,IA UNIVEKSITY Of WELLINGTON 
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the time of the J a panese surrender, August 9, 1945. This is the date 
on which Japan accepted the terms of the Allied Powers as spelled out in 
the Potsdam Proclamation, July 26, 1945. The SCAP ordered the Japanese 
authorities to return a ll vessels registered in Korea but removed to 
Japan by the Japane s e arter the Ju l y date. The ROK's request to include 
the issue of fisheries was refused by Japan. In late 1951, th e pre-
liminary talks were suspend e d without any progress in resolving the 
issues. The first rorrnal ROK-Japan co nference (Feb.-Apr. 1952) dis-
c ussed the is s ues concerning basic (diplo~atic) relations; the ROK's 
c l aim to cornpens e tion for l osses of property and lives under Japanese 
rule; and the Japanese claim to compensation for p roperty fo r merly held 
in Knre a , in addition to the issues already opened to discussion in 
preliminary talks. During the successive conferences, a number of 
important is s ues were added to the already tense question list. They 
were the Peace Line (or Rhee Line, as it is called by Japan); the ROK's 
demand for the return of Korean art objects removed to Japan; the fate 
of Japanese fisherman interned in the ROK in violation of the Peace 
Line; the repatriation of the Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea; 
and above all the questions of two Koreas and jurisdictional control of 
the ROK in the Korean peninsula. (1) 
The objective of this paper, however, is to examine and analyse, 
from an historical and a juridical point of view, one of the longest 
and most acrimonious fishery controversies between two of the States of 
Asia, and what extent and degree the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law 
of Sea had told on the content of the 1965 ROK-Japan Agr e ement on 
Fisheries. Although the Korean-Japanese dispute is not as much in 
(1) Kwan Bong Kim, "The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability 
of the Korean Political System'' (Praeger Publishers New York 1971) 
pp 40-54. 
Park Chung !dee, "The Country, the Revolution and I'' (English version 
by Leon Sinder, Hollym Corporation, Seoul, 1963) p. 156-158. 
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limelight as are many of the other disagreements which had emerged in 
the second half of the twentieth century, this conflict is nonetheless 
one which concerns and affects not only States but their populations in 
the most elementary sense of the term. Fishing and Fisheries are basic 
and significant parts of the economy and livelihood of the Koreans and 
Japanese, and of still greater impact is the fact that marine animal 
resources comprise a major source of the food products consumed by 
these peoples. Moreover, the issues involved in this dispute are not 
of an isolated nature. Many other St2tes th ro ughout the world are faced 
with analogous problems and engaged in fishery controversies of their 
own. Hence, once the differences between Seoul and Tokyo are resolved 
in 1965 through a negotiated agreement which is obviously the only 
formula by which tney should and must be solved, the terns of the agree-
ment may well serve asa precedent for terminating other difficulties of 
this kind. Indeed, if States as antagonistic to each other as Japan and 
Korea are eventually able to settle questions which go to the core of 
t~eir fundamental interests through legal ~ean s then, at the very least, 
States which are historically less ho stile toward one another should 
be able to achieve sim il a r results in similar instances. And in the 
light of the climate which has prevailed between t hese two countries 
for more than a generation, and in view of the nature of the quarrel, 
the procedure by which a solution is finally reached, especially after 
the length of time which has e lapse d and th e numerous efforts which 
have been undertaken, may become a guideline which third States with 
different problems of vital import to them may wish to emulate. 
As a matter of fact there is still an unsolved problem between 
ROK and Japan concerning the question of title to '' DoKdo" Island 
(Takeshirna in Japanese) which consists of two s mall islands located in 
the Sea of Japan. Even in the Third United Nations Conference on the 
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Law of Sea, Korea and Japan have been pitted against each other with 
regard to the high sea fishing. Of course, we cannot assert that all 
states of the world have precisely the same interests in the proximate 
waters. However, Korea has first-hand knowledge of Japan, whose fishing 
interests have been used as a pawn in Asian power politics. The 
Republic of Korea was emancipated after long domination by foreign 
dynasties, and the desire for higher prestige and self-respect was 
admitted to be one of the forces motivating Korean fishery claims 
against Jap~n. A thriving fishery for Korea can be viewed as a desir-
Able goal value in itself in terms of nation 8 l pride. 
May 1st, 1978. 
2. FISHERY DISPUTE~ BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN 
BEFORE THE 1965 AGREE ME~T ON FISHERIES 
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After the Second World War the Supreme Commander for t~e Allied 
Power ~CAP) limiterl the area available to Japanese fishing and whaling 
operations on 20, August 1945 for reasons o f military security. The 
first official '' MacArthur Line " was established in September, 1945 a~d 
until 1950, gradu a lly extended to a consider able a re2 reaching far out 
into the Pacific on the east, and pa s2ing through the Sea of Japan and 
the East China Sea and approaching the north-west coast of For mosa on 
the west and ev en to the equator for tu na fishin g only. 
However, despite of repeated warnings from the Occupation Author-
ities and occasional seizures ot fishing boats by the Chinese Nationalist, 
Russian and Korean Governme n ts, the l1acArthur Lin e was constantly 
violated. (1) The MacArthur Li ne restrictions were finally abolished 
by a SCAP Memoran dum to the Japanese Government on 25 April 1952, three 
days befor e the San Fr 2ncisco Peace Treaty (2 ) cam e into effect. 
The TreAty of Peace with Jap a n, recognizi ng the in dependence of 
Korea in its Article 2, provided in Article 9 that; "Japan will enter 
promptly negotiations wi th t he Allied 0 owers so desiring f ~r the con-
clusion of bi later e l and multilateral agreements providing for the 
regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development 
of fisheries on th e high se ns. Furthermore, Article 21 of the same 
Treaty said that Korea, though not on e of the Allied Powers, ''s hall be 
entitled to the benefits of t ~ese two Articles." This pledge did not 
terminate all differences be tween two countries, nor did the sus~ension 
of the Mac Arthur Li~e imply that the Japanese could again operate in all 
(1) The Worl d Torlay (~oyal Institute of Int e rnational Affairs, Chatham 
House Review, 1954) v~l. 10 pp 4Q- 50. The Maritim e Safety Board in Nov. 
1952 g2ve the total of Japan ese fishing boats seized since 1945 as 468; 
China had seized 88, the USSR 195, Korea 1J1 and Nationalist China 54; 
of these a total of 255 had been returned. 
(2) UNTS Vol. 136 P.45. 
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of the Yellow Sea west coast) of Korea and East China Seas. On the con-
trary the difficulties with the Republic of Korea now began in earnest. 
Korea contented t'1a t the If a cA rth ur Line remained in force, ( 1 ) but more 
important, President Syngman Rhee, as early as January 18, 1952, had 
issued a "Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas.'' Through 
this measure, which the Korean President based on ''well-established 
international precedents'' (as prescribed in its prea1. bl8) an r justified 
on an 'ir 1p e 11 i ng need'' to safeguard p errnanen tl y the na tiona 1 we 1 fare and 
defence of the Republic, Korea declared her sovereignty over the contin-
ental shelf and the super jacent waters and established an excJusi.ve fishery 
zone off her coasts. At certain points these zones reach a distance of 
about two hundred miles from her shores and leave the Japanese fishermen 
a smaller body water than had been permitted under the r1acArthur Line. 
President Rhee's pronounceMent is in essence a replica of the Peru-
vian Decree. (2) Nevertheless, the Korean Governi1ent has relied on this 
Decree and Truman's Presidential Proclamation without drawing any dis-
tinction between them. To prevent disadvantageous exploitatiJn a~d to 
reserve, protect, consPrve and utilize all kinds of resources and natural 
wealth that may be found on, within or under the seas, 'Korean National 
Sovereignty'' is claiMed over the waters adjacent to the shores but no 
specific depth or width limit is found in this declaration. (3) 
(1) B Erittin and L G Watson, ''Internationa Law for Se-,going Officers" 
(2nd ed Annapolis : US N2val Institute 1960) pp 523-24. 
Sayre A Schwarztrauber, "The Three-llile Limit of Territorial Sea" 
(Annapolis, Naval !Gstitute Press 1972) p. 189. 
(2) UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER/1 (1951) rPresidentisl Decree concarning the 
Continental Shelf and Coastal Fj sheries in the Adjacent Se,s 11 (1, Aug.1947) 
(3) F B Garcia 1\mador, nn-,e cxpl:JitaUon and Conservation of the Resour-
ces ·1f the Sea" (AW Sythoff 1963) p. 7'J. Sayre A .3chwarztrauber, ibid. 
p. 190 The ne,, Korean fishery conserv,.,tion zone was gPographically the 
same ris the forr,er r11acArthu r Line protective zone, and included all wciters 
within a peri~eter delimited by a series of nine straight lines, the Rhee 
Line, - from the Korean-Soviet border, through the Sea of Japan, the 
Korea Strait, 2,nd the Yellow Sea to the Korean-Chinese oorder. The sea 
area within this zone is more than three times greater than South Korea 
itself, and at one point the Rhe s Line boundary is 175 miles from the 
adjacent South Korean shoreline. 
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The "Presidential Proclanation of Sovereignty o ver the Adjc1cent 
Seas" ( 1) spe~ks of, .;s do the Latin Ar eric?n acts, (2) a zone uf co'1-
trol and protection under t~e jurisdiction and control of Korea, which 
may be m~dified ~n the basis of circu~stances strn1ming from subsequent 
discoveriee, studies and intrrests (Article 3). Yet there is no doubt 
that ~area h? s sought sovoreignty OV8r these w2ters s ince the para-
graph s (Article 3(2)) whicn detail the latilud inal delimit2tion describe 
the zone as one placec under the s0vereignty and protection of the 
Rep ub 1 ic of Korea. The Korean Pre sidential Prom ul gation was 2p parently 
is s ued to other cou n tries in ge ne ral but may be interpreted as pro-
hibiting ~apanese fishing operatio ns in that area s ince o nly Japanese 
fishermen are rj irectl y interested in the area. Of course, t '1 e J a panese 
Foreign Offica imnediately issued a protest, whic h describe d the "Rhee 
Lin e or Pe~ce Lin e" ~s violating tne principl e s ~f t he fre edom of the 
high seas. Ne vPrtheless , on 27 January 1952 , the RDK r eas serted its 
c lairn ad listed ~s inte r nat i onal p reced e nts, f o r i,stance, the 
Declaration made by President Truman on coastal fishery and t r e natural 
resources on the sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, and the 
statements of similar nature issued by Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru 
and Costa Rica. She also contended that "the special status of adjacent 
seas" was held to be recognized by many international bodies, including 
t he International Law Comn,ission, and those who still adhered to the 
19th century concept of the freedom of fishing on adjacent seas must be 
considered as being unaware of t he evolution of international law. (3) 
The r~ acA r tt1 ur Line was dis ti ngui shed f ram the Rhee Line on the ground 
that the Forner liniited the area in which the Japanese could operate 
(1) UN Docs ST/LEG/~lR. B/6 (1 957) and ST/LEG/SER. 8/8 (1959) 
(2) Article 3 of the 1947 Peruvian rresidential Decree, Article 3 of the 
1947 Chilean Presidential Declaration and Article 3 of the 1949 Costa 
Rica L8gislative Decree. 
( 3 ) 1·1 W r·1 out an, ''The Continental Shelf'' ( f a rt in us Ni j ho ff , the Ha 9 u e , 
1952) p. 320. 
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while the latter as a proclamation of protective seas (Art. 1 and 2), 
restricted both Koreans and Japanese and did not extend Korea's 
territorial waters. 
In the meantime, the 195C Korean \Jar, which resulted in the in-
filtration of spies and contraband into the Republic of Korea and pre-
sented difficultiesin controlling Communist prisoners in camps on the 
off s ho re is 1 and s , led to Urn est a b 1 is h men t o f a ''Se a Defence Zone 11 ( 1 ) 
This Zone, whic~ was imposed on September 27, 1952 by the Headquarters 
of the UN Army in Korea and which its Commander, General l1 ark \J Clark, 
de s cribed as ''strictly a wartime measure" (2) was patrolled by UN naval 
ships. QuicKly known as tne "Clark LL1e", it extended from a point in 
the sea twelve miles offshore from the Russian frantier on the east 
coast of Korea to the islands along the south cuast and frohl there along 
the west coast to a distance u f twe~ve ~iles off the Manchurian b~rder. 
It encompRssed an Areas, aller than that clained urder the Rnee Proclam-
.~tion , and 0,n y ship entering this blockade area of the "Clark Line" was 
subject to sParch. But this line complicated the Japanese-Kore~n 
differences in fishery disputes. (3) 
( 1 ) U ~, Do c A/ Cu r\ F 1 3 / 2 7 ( 1 9 S 8 ) • Uni t e d r rn t i on s L e g i s 1 a t i v e Se r i e s 
( 1 9 5 9 ) Vo 1 g p • 2 7 • Korean r I a r 1. n e Defence L 2 w , No 1 0 4 n f r·, arch 2 , 1 9 5 0 , 
Article 1 of which provides that the President of the Republic, by fixing 
a b o u n d 2 r y , d e s i g n '3 t e s so r1 e a r e a a s t h e '' S ea o f '.) e fun c e ·, , l n t h e c as e o f 
extraordinary necessity ciu ri ng a time of for 11al war ::ir civil war. 
(2) I W Clark, ''Frorn the 02nube to the "alu" (H-rper, r:ew Vork , 1954) 
P• 154. 
('·1i) r~Pw ,ork Tirnes, Oct. 16, 1"52, f'l • 4 col 2 and, o v. 2 , 1952, p. 7 col 
1 f·r W ClarK, ap cit, supra, note 9 at 156. 0'le of the ohjc::ctives rf tr1e 
Clark Line was to exercise uetter control over the numerous boats , both 
f\orean and J apanese, and that it replaced the 1-lacArthur Line. 
S Oda has taken issu8 with this ~8script i on , stating that it "appears 
erroneous '' , and remarking that the demarcation was not designed to ex-
clude Japanese fishing vessels. He has further relate · that the "a"lbigu-
ous'' attitude of the UN Co mm a 'ld with regard to Japanese craft led to a 
protest fro~ that Government, Pnd ~as referred to nowspeper ~ccounts to 
indicate that an understandi ng was reached as a resuJt of which the zone 
did not affect 'ler people. rowrver, lrark Clark's 1emoirs leave no doubt 
that the delimited waters were ''definitely barred to J~panese vessels". 
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On DecPr1ber 12, 1954, "Fishery Resources Conservation Law" (Law 
nunber 2°8), which established fishery conservation zones and called for 
~ermits to fish wit,in these waters (Article 2), w2s promulgated by 
Korea. (1) 
Those who violate~ this statute were subject to a pri-on term or 
pen2l s8rvitude ~at in excess of three years, or a fine up to 500,000 
Hwan ($1,000), and t~eir boats, equipment, c~tch, and cultured and manu-
factured products ran the risks of being confiscated (Art III). lven a 
craft in transit, if suspected of fishing in the Rhee Line (Peace Line) 
without a license, could be visits or seJrched Gnd any other neces~ary 
disposition of it (Art IV). T'le R ee procla 1 ation 2dds that the declar-
ation of ssvereignly ~ver the adjacent seas is not designed to affect 
freedom of navigation (Art 4). However, no provision was nade for joint 
agreements for the establishment of conservation zones; the legitimate 
rights of other states are not even recognized, although the Fishery 
Resources Conservation Law, which calls for permits to fishing in the 
delimited areas, does not by its terms draw any specific distinction 
between Korean and foreign nationals. 
Application for the license must be filed with the appropriate 
I~ i n i s t er , t h r o u g h the 11 a y o r o f S e o u 1 S p e c i a l C i t y o r the p r o v i n c i a 1 
Governor, in accordance with Article 3 of "Regulation for the Enforce-
ment of Fishery Resources Conservation Law
11 promulgated on January 18, 
1955. (2) The number of permits which may be issued can not exceed 
those which have been conferred up to February 19, 1952 (Art 2 of Regu-
lation for the Enforcement of Fishery Resou rces Conservation Law), and 
the ''Fishery or f•1arine Products Industry Law " (Law 296 , promulgated 
9 Sept. 1953) states that grants to aliens must be approved by the House 
of Representatives (Art 5) . In a sense, claims such as those fo und in 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
UN Docs. ST/LEG/SlR. 8/6 (1957) and ST/ LEG/SER. B/8 (1959) 
U~ Docs. ST/LEG/SER. 8/8 1959) and A/CONF. 13/27 (1958) 
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the Rhee Proclamation , the Fishery esources Conservalion Law and its 
Regulation for the Enforcement, and Fishery or r1arine Products Industry 
Law, especially in relation to restrictions placed on the issuance o f 
licenses, hardly coincide wlth an assertion that the Rhee Line is not 
designed to extend the territorial waters of the Republic of Korea. 
D W Bowett pointed out that the ~orean Proclamation of 18 Jan. 1952, 
followed by the Law for the Conservation of Fishery Resources of 12 
Dec. 1954 was an extreme example of a claim to "virtual monopoly" of the 
resources within limits extending to 200 miles from the coast at certain 
points, and that the exclusion of Japanese vessels from a high sea 
fishery was apparently based upon the ass8rtion of a preferer1tial claim 
by a coastal state and the need for conservation. (1) Those claims may 
be classi f ied as 'exclusive claims" describec..J by !·1 5 1cDougal. (2) 
After the Promulgation of the Peace Line in 1952 until 19 64 
numerous Japanese ships were in fact captured by the Korean i.avy and 
hundreds of her fishermen were arrested, detained and sentenced. ( 3) 
A total of 232 Japanese vessels seized and 2 ,784 fisher~en were sentenced 
to terms ranging from a few months to more than one year in the Aliens ' 
Detention Camp in Pusan. Subsequently a number of rallies condemning 
the Peace Line and the ROK took place in Tokyo and other western Japanese 
coastal citi es. Th e local fisherman , the families of those detained by 
Korea, and their representatives in local and national legislatures 
demanded from the Government better protection for Japanese vessels, 
suspension of trade with the ~OK, and other retaliatory ~easurbs 
(1) D Ll iJowlett, 'The Law of t he Sea" (l1dncnester Unlversity Press ·1 :;167) 
p. 28 
(2) l. yres S r,cO::>Ugal ano William T !:lurks , ''The Public Order of lJcl:lans" 
( Ya l e Un i v G r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 2 ) p • 1 , no t e 1 , i n w hi c h an '' e x c l us i v e c l a i m ·r 
i s d e s c r i b e d a s '' 2 c 1 a i m to u s e o r a u t ri o r i t y o v e r a n a r ea o r o v er 
specified activities which other states cannot share with the claimant 
state''. 
(3) Douglas 1•1 Johnston, ''The International Law of Fisheries" (Yale 
Universi y Press 1965) p. 217 . 
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against tt,e ROK . In the midst of this mutual escalation of hostility, 
Japan repatriated twenty pro-comnunist Koreans residing in Japan to 
North Korea, as a prelude to the nass repatriation of Koreans that 
started in Dec . 1959. The United States de8ply concerned over the 
aggravation of relations between t11e two cou'ltries , stepped in and 
mediated the agrement which arranged a repatriation to South Korea of 
sane 6 , 000 Korean families residing in Japan (most of whom had been 
forcibly conscripted 1.1bourers d11ring the Jap nose rule) in an effort to 
cancel out t~e Japan e se plan for the mass repatriation to North Korea. 
However , the ROK and Japan fail8d to agree on the ninor technic-
ality of selecting the proper chanrel for nandling the r&patriates' 
settlement fees . After this brea ~down the nass repatriation of Koreans 
to ~orth Korea began , and it further co~triouted to exdcerbation of their 
relationq . Thus , ~hose Gordian knots of the repatriation , the Peace 
Line (called as a ·' ~rudging L ne" to Japanese people) , arid the fisnery 
probJem inclu~1ng seizure of J=pa11es c vessels and fjsher~en genPrated 
t~e arn oti ona l stress and huMan sufferings . (1) 
(1) Kwan Bong KiM , op cit. pp . 18-64 . 
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3. ASSESSME T OF THE HEE LI~E 
The Agreement on Fisheries concluded by the Republic of ~orea and 
Japan in 1965 r1entions neither the 11 Rhee Line ' nor the reparation claims 
arising from the estaolishment of this Rhee Line zone. Insteac a joint 
regulation zone is establis~ed ~ff the Korean coast, where the pro-
vision ~! regulation measures described in the Annex are to be imple-
mented with respect to drag-net fishing and sei~e fishing and ~ackerel-
angling fishing by vessels over 60 tons, until such tine as conservation 
r1eas•Jres "ecessary to naintain maximum sust"'ined productivity of fisriery 
res~urces ere implemented on the basis of sufficient scientific surveys 
(Art II, III of t~e Agreement, and 8lso An~ex and Agreed Minutes) . 
Outside tl1e joint regulation zo:,e, joint resr1urces survey zone are 
to be established, the extent of which and t~e nature of t e sur,,ey to 
oe conducted witl in which are to be determined ~fter consultation betwaen 
both countries on the bnsis of recommerdat1ons to be made by the ROK-
Japan Joint Fisheries Commission (Art V). Once t~ e prirciple of tho 
freedom of the high seas is stipulated in tt,e preamble of th8 Agreement 
on Fisherieq between tJo countries, the hoe Line of t~e ~residential 
Procl~mation is unten~ble especially in terms of freedom of fishing on 
the high seas outside tre exclusive 12 mile f ishery zone. Profec::sor 
Kym Chong-Soo p~inted OLJt thAt the Article 4 ~f President Rhee's 
Proclamation in 1952, which Jnly pPrmitt.~d free~om of navigation , might 
be considsre~ as a grbat revision under the prea,~ble of the 1965 Agree-
ment on ~i shPries between two countries. (1) 
(1) Kym Chong-Soo, 11 Hcnil Joeyake Gwanhan Yakganeui f'loonjejom" (Some 
problems on ~OK-Japan Treaty) Chonnam Law Journal, Vol. 3 (the Law 
Journal Hs sociation of the Chonnam r~ational University, Kwang-ju, 
Korea, 1967) p. 10. 
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As a matter of fact, the Rhee Line whose legality has by implica-
tion been rejected at the Leneva Conferences, has little foundation in 
international law. Of all the precedents cited by Korea only the 
equally debatable decrees and declarations of less than a handful of 
Latin American states lend it any semblance of support. The Rhee Line 
is not furthered by either of the two Truman Proclamations, or by the 
1958 Continental Shelf Conven ion or even by the Fishery and Conservation 
Convention. The latter instrument, which might be regarded as particu-
1 a r 1 y he 1 p f u 1 in g i v i n g i t a ba si s , s i 11 c e i t r e co g n i z e s t he ' s p e c i a l 
interests of the coastal state'' (Art 6) in maintaining the productivity 
of marine animal resources in areas of tl1e high seas adJacent to its 
territorial waters and permits it to enact unilateral 111easu es to this 
end (Art?), lends no such assistance. (1) The expansion of fishing 
zones independent of the territorial waters is not witt1in tne framework 
of the Geneva Conventions. Since the Geneva Conferences, States have, 
of course, enlarged their territorial sea or their fishery limits, but 
in so doing have taken precautions to keep such moves within fairly 
narrow bounds. Howave, according to the Rhee Line, the Government of 
the Rep u b l i c o f Ko r ea ho l d s a n d e x e r c i s e s t h e '' n a t ion a 1 so v e re i g n t y " o v e r 
the continental shelf and its epicontinental seas adjacent to the coasts 
of the peninsula and islands of the national sovereignty, no matter 
what their depths may be, throughout the extension, deemed necessary to 
reserve, protect, conserve and utilize the resources and ~atural wealth 
of all kinds tl1at may be found on, in or unde the said seas, pL .. cing 
( 1 ) f' 1 a r Jo r i e l"I W n i tern an , 11 0 i g e s t of 1 n tern at ion a 1 Law 11 ( Depart rn en t a f 
State Publication 7825) Vol. 4 (19o5) pp. 1185-1189. 
Park Jong-Sung, r An Analysis of the Korea-Japan FishHry Disput~s 11 , 
(5 ko1ea uarterly i\o. 2 (1963) p. 67. The Rtiee Line involves a 
doctrine which has not been accepted by a rnajority of coastal States. 
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under the Go ver nment super visions pa rticularly th e fishing and marine 
hunting ind ustries in order to pre vent this exhaustible type of re-
s ources and natural wealth from being exploited to the advantage of tl1e 
inhabitants of Kor e a , u r decreas e d or destroyed to t he detriment of the 
co untry . 
In spite of the fact that th e instrument of ROV-Japan Fishery 
Agreement does no t so much as mention the abolition of the Rhee Line , 
and even though Korean officials have at times s tated that the Agreene nt 
does not lift the Lin e, the practical effects o f the settlement virtually 
remove the restrictions imp osed by President Rhee's Proc aMation . Indeed 
Kore a n Pub l.:.c Information 1-linister, Hong Jo 'l g-Ch u l an r10uncecJ th a t , upon 
t he exchange o f t hE: ins t run,e n ts of r a tification , President Park would 
issue a decree permitting Japan e se f ... s nermen to operate within he 
waters encloseJ by t ne Rhee Line . (1) 
The question of whether the Rhee Line still exists, notwithstanding 
the prea~bular provision of the Agre emen t and the a nno uncement of Korean 
Government, however , is answer e d in t he affirmative by the Go vernment of 
Kor e a sta t ing that t he ROK-J a pan Fisheries Agreemen t suits the purpose 
of the Presidential Proclamation an d only replaces the uni ateral nature 
of the Rhee Line with t he bilateral agreement to get more effective 
enfo r cement o f t he P esiderit i al Proclam ution . (:) The Rhee Line may 
conti nue to exist for t ~e purpos e of nati onal secur i ty (Sea Defence Zone) 
and the preser vation of continental s helf r esources . (3) 
(1) r ew Yor k Time s , 0 -:.- c . 1L , 195:> p. 8, col . 1. 
( 2 ) Jo e '-! y o -won , '' 0 a eh an I Ii n g u k g w a I l b or, g u k g a n e u i Jo yo k ri i t 
Hyopjong tfo esnl' (Explam1 tion o f Treaty and Agrsern trnt :.Jetween ths ROK and 
Jap , n) (Gov e rnment nf the ~U k pu blication, Se oul, 1 9 65) p . 34 . 
(3) In th e prear1ble of the 1952 ~ area Presidential J:roclamation it 
s tip u late s t f1 at • • • ·1 u - g e d by t ~ e imp e 11 in g ne e d of 3 a f e g u a rai n g the 
interests of natio - al we l fare an d defence • •• " 
Lee Han-Ki , ''Gukj e boo r ok r (In t ernatio nal Law) Vol. I (Bak Yongsa 
publi ca tion , Seoul , 19 ?3) µ . ~- 1. 
kym Chonq-Sno , op c it ( : hon ~arn Law J~urnal Vnl . 3) pp. 8- 9 . 
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4. TWO L,.IRCLE. r UT C01.Cd Ti"11C I GENEVA Cu1ift::RC::1 CE ON 
FlSHI,.G Af D CL,~SC: VAriur, wF Ti1C:: LIV f.L Ht:..5JuRC£S 
1. At the 1955 Internatiunal Tecnricdl Conference on the Conservation 
f the Living Resourc~s of the Sea which was held in Rone under the 
auspices of the United rations and the Food ~nd Agricultural Orgdnisation, 
and attended by represe~tatives an~ observers of more t~an fifty States 
dnd intar-n,overn~er tal fishery org~nizu ions, including those of Japan 
and Korea, two Jppos1ng st~nd~ were t~ken with reg~rd to the role ~r 
coast~l StEte~. ne group including KJ re ~ belie ve ~ t~at lhe coastai 
State haj a sp ec ic1 interPst iri cons 0 rvat'on, and some of the supporters 
of this pnsitjon even sugg8sted tr,at shore Stat~s alone should be en-
trusted wi.th control :-ind co,1servation rneasur '5 i I th water:s "ear i s 
shores, subject nnly to tachn logica and ecol~gical linit2 ions. (1) 
The contrury view of the ot·1er yroup includi• g Japan argued tt;at the 
coaqtal State should refrain frori adopting rules without fir st reaching 
agree~ent with other interestLd ·tates. T is positiJn was based on the 
consideration that such mecisures should be foun ded on scientific and 
trchr i ca l facts, th=:t the coas dl State is wit ne ceEsarily better 
qualified to ~ssess scientific truth, and that all of the States in-
volvPd shoulJ ha ve an oppurtunity to submit scientific e vidence which 
should o~ rega dad on an equ3l bass ir t~e draftirg Jf con serv - ion 
plans. The ConfPrence d cideJ that it was not competert to deal w:th 
t,e pr0p sal concerning the compe unce of the c ~astal State, but nated 
trat in tne f~rmulat1on of conserv0tion pro~rammes account should be 
taken of the special interbsts of t~e coastal State in maintaining the 
~1) Lee Han-Ki, ibid. p. 332. 
'Report of the International Technical Coriference on Consa vation of 
Living Resources of the Sea, 1 UN Doc A/CL F 10/6, Section VI, para. 45 
(195;:,). 
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productivity of the living resources of the high seas adjacent to its 
coasts. 
2. The Korean delegation to the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas found Article 4 
inadequate. In discussing its terms Mr Lee Soo-Young noted that a con-
servation agreement for 11 any area" or "areas of the high seas" in which 
joint fishing took place involved an arrangement with regard to two dis-
tinct bodies of water. The first comprised the area of the high seas 
adjacent to the territorial waters of the coastal state; the second the 
high seas not so adjacent. Without stating where one zone ended and the 
other began, he remarked that the procedures outlined in Article 9 were 
sufficient for the latter but inadequate for the former region, since 
they disregarded the special interests of the contiguous state whose 
nationals were fishing alongside of other nations for certain species of 
fish. He offered an amendment to the provision (Art. 4) which, notwith-
standing the existence of negotiations for purpose of reaching agreement 
on conservation regulations (Art. 4), would have granted the coastal 
State the right to invoke the terms of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention 
(1) He found the merit of his draft in the fact that it enabled the 
coastal State to participate in any system of regulation and conservation 
of the living resources in the area concerned and if necessary, to adopt 
unilateral conservation measures. (2) 
As a matter of fact, Korea abstained on the substantive parts of 
the Convention, because she objected to the system of compulsory arbitra-
tion (Art. 9), and introduced an amendment which provided for the settle-
ment of disputes in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations 
(1) UN Conference on the Law of Sea (Official Record Vol. V; third 
Committee 24 Feb - 27 Apr 1958, Geneva) pp. 42.144. 
UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C 3/L. 34 (1958) 
(2) UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/41 at 42 (1958) 
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Chart8r. Korea prosumed that, since the Convention did not give pref-
erence to the coastal State in insta nces of d1sagreenent, optional 
arbitration would "improve' the chances of a satisfactory solution. (1) 
Th8 ci .iscussion and proposals on the sp8cial status of the coastal State 
clearly reveal the differencbs between Korea and Japan. Korean Govern-
n1ent asserted that efforts made by the shore tate to prevent overfishing 
an d exhaustion of stacks of fish were ba s ed on legitimate claims to the 
exploitation and conservation of the fishery resources in the coastal 
waters. The Korean representative added tridt recog ition of such a 
right woul d uoviously be i n t 1.s i nterest of t ri e international community 
since any State that engaged 1n unrestricted fishing in total disregard 
of the co~stal f ;s·1eribs of another State was in fact abusing the free-
dom of fishing. (2) On the ot her hand, the Japanese delegate firmly 
oppos8d to granting the coastal ~tate any special authority, introduced 
a proposal to this effect (3) and stated that, since t he concept of 
conservation was of a scien ific and not of a political or eGonomic 
nature, t he coa stal State should not be in a ''privileged position~ and 
should not possess the unilateral right of regulating fishing on tne 
high seas ~imply by virtue of its geographical position. (4) While 
tl-ie Japanese delegati o n f elt t · at t he Conservation provisions went 
loo far in rotecting ~he interes s of the coastal ~tatG, t~eir ~orean 
counterpart thought tl-iat U·ey left much to be desired. A Kor e an dele-
gate suggest~d to t~e Third Committee th 2 t t 1e s nore Stat e shoulo, on 
Urn b a s i s o f s c i en t i f i c f i n ri 1 n g s , c n joy t h e ' e Y c 1 us .:. v e r i g h t " o f con -
trolling n I regulating fistnng artivities Jver a reaso~dble distance(S) 
( ,, ) U,\ Con"'erence on the Law of BJ, op cit p. 153 \ I 
ur11 Ooc. A/cc · r 13/C 3/L. 64 (1 1 5C). u Doc A/Cu \ F 1 J/ 3 at 4b.4o (19r3) 
LJ 1· Doc. A/C ..F 13/41 at :c 1958) 
( 2) ur Doc A/C " :.F 13/11 at Ll.i ( 1 J 3) 
' = ) u~: Doc A/C0 F 1 "'/ C 3/L .:i3 (1958) 
( 4) I r~ Doc A/Cu'F 13/ 41 at 41 1 1 9 rJ 8 ) • Se e also itJid ut 7. 
( 5) u r .. Ooc Pi/ Cu .~ ·t j/ 41 at L, (1-sa) 
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of th8 high se- s adja c ent to it~: terri ta rial 1..va ters . At no time , i-,ow6ver 
did he specify th8 extent of this distan c e . 
Korean Government infor rned the First Committee that the 3-r,ile 
limit was no longer adequate and tl,at no ru'e governing the breadth of 
the territorial sea could stand the tbst of practical application if i t 
did not pro vide an adequate safeguard for the par =m ount interest of the 
coastal S~ate. (1) Korean delegati n sought to amend Article 6 as 
follows; "a coast c1l State , whicl-) nas made 'sacrifices" in its efforts 
to corservP to t~e living r8sources , through restraints on its own 
fi s hermen in Mny ar'"'a . . . • (of the high se3s acjacent to its territor-
ial sea) , mRy require otter Sta tes to refrain fro~ fishing in the said 
area until such time as a sufficie ~t y;eld from the resources hrs been 
rest~red.'' ( 2 ) S01,1e guara ~tee agai.-,st the adoption of controls of an 
arbitr~ry nature was f ound , accordir g to the Kore3n representativ8 , in 
the requirer1ent of Ar ticle 7 that t1ey be a sed on "CiE.ntific f inrfings . (3): 
11,nb~ ssador Senjin Ti;uruok;:i of Japan lost no tirne in attacking the 
Ko re2n oropo~al. He dessribed it as giving the coastal tats 11 a f'shing 
monopoly'' (4) merely as a re~ult uf the fact that it Cdrri ed an fishin g 
i n the w ate r <> i n l u E:! s t i o n and c ·, a r a c t er i z e rl the de f .1 n i t i o n o f II s a c r i f i c e s1 
as so Vdgue c S to :..ead to abuse , since it was common to impose some 
kind ~f limitation, sue~ as a restriction on the size of the fish, t~e 
Mesh of nets or the fis hing sEason . Such a regime that gave t e coastal 
3t,.,te a fishing 11 ono po ly a~d excluded ot ers without coinpensdtion Fron 
8xploiting particular areas of the open sea was termed i~aquitablo dnd 
~t v rianca with t~e principl~s of equality 1f States before the law 
an d :.he freeci'Jr.i f the high mas. 1 (5) 
( 1 ; u· D,, C . A/ ,c• F 13/3Q at 44 ( ., 58) 
( 2) UN Conference on the Law of Sed , ioid . pp. 148-149. 
u Do c. A/COi.F 13/C 3/L 45 . b0 . 66 . 86 (1958) 
( 3) ur Doc. A/COf\.F 13/ 41 at b1 (1~58) 
( 4) ur Doc . A/CGl·,F 13/ 41 at 1 05 (1958) 
( s ) ur~ Doc . A/CO, F 1'J/41 at 1 o:.., (19G8) 
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Korea , on the other hand, suggested that the right to fish in the 
oceans was ''not a uni vo rsall y valid principle, 11 argued that Japan sought 
to justify an unrestricted exercise of freedom of fishing to the dbtri-
ment of the co~stal State, criticiz8d her for disregarding the special 
interests of the coastal state and for 11ot nicognizing tne con,patence 
of tnat State to take unilateral measures in urgent cases, and added 
that the Japanese err8d in invoking freedom of he seas without regard 
to "restri ctive stipulations not r lated to fishing . (1) 
Anyway, not only did Korea abstain and subsB 4 ently refrain from 
placing her signature on the instrurnBnt and on t he Conv8ntion on lhe 
High ~eas, but neither ChilG, f.Jeru, Ecuador or 11~x1co s1yned either 
document, although the salfle 11ay be saiu , ev"n if for diff8 ent reasons, 
of apan. Undoubtedly, ti'le Latin 1-1111e 1can reprt:Jsentatives raaliz&d that 
the terms of t!1e Convention dio not support their Presidential Declar-
ations; nor can the regime of the Fishing and Conservation Convention 
be cited in justification of the Korean Proclamation. Once again it is 
worthy of note that the Convention does not acknowledgb the right of the 
co2stal State to extend its control over high seas fishing and fisheriBs 
at its own discretion; rather, it deals witr, non-exclusionary fisheries 
conservation on the op8n sea ~nd not with the autr ority ~f Lhe contiguous 
State to block off parts of t,1e Jceans fo r exclusive fishing by its own 
natiopals. 
1) L~ Doc. A/C 1F . 13/41 at 108 1:i5) 
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s. CO NSER VATIOI'. CF FIS11ERY I E30lJr1Ct.J 
Cons erva ion, which is a subject that mu s be discusC'.ed in connectior 
wit h high seas fishing resources, is a universally accepted concept of 
fishery science. r he term , ''co r l s er vat ion II is defined i n Article 2 of 
the 1 9:.J8 Geneva Convention on Fis f1 ing and Cons E rva tion of the Liv i11g 
Resources of the High Seas dS the "ag gregute of the measures rendering 
possible t~e optimum sustainable yield from those resourcec so dS to 
secure a ri aximui,l supply af fo-,d and ott1er marine! products.'' Conservation 
programmes shoul~ be ~ormulat8d w1t11 a vied to s·curing in the firct 
place a supply for ruman consumption. T~e belief t~at the res ou rces of 
th8 sea re inexhaustible, arid th e corollary that their expl~itation 
should go unregulated are r o longer suµported. Tnerefore , sane c~ntrol 
over the expl~ita~ion of the~e marine res~urces is needed if the fullest 
utili zation of ocean treasures is to ue assured. An att~m~t at su c cess-
ful internati~nal regulatinn of high s eas fisheries must be preceJed by 
complete scientific studies of fish stock dS a p relim inary step towards 
effrctive control of tis~ing. (1) HowLv2r, the proble~of tishery differ 
w1 ely from sea to sea; tne practical proclens of ~is,eries conservati~n 
do not :enj themselves to ~ny aasy solution by means of 3gr 0ements ~r 
world-wide "'PPli cat ion . Hie lJcalized character of r ost of the Fis 1ery 
questions arising between nations 1ust 1ot b negl ctca a'ld each should 
e de-lt w~th oy those nations whose tisherr1en are active in the particu-
lar fishery concerned. For several centurie, int~rnation~l contra-
ver sies ... av B existed C'lncerning t1 e rights of fishermen to fish wl erever 
they please, a~o c rre 1 atively, t e ri_hts of a cou'ltry to r ohibit non-
nationals fro fis~ing in part·cular waters, bSpecia:ly w-ters a jacent 
(1) r, S Douslas ;:ind u T rke, "'P c·t. pp . 701-u3 . 713-16 . 721-2.4 . 757-76..J 
Shigeru Jda "International Contra'.. of JPa R"'source'"'" 
(Sy+norf, 1SG ) PP• J~-58. 
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to their shares. 
In rec8nt years, wit~ over-· xploitation of sane fis~erles and 
increased s c~entific conservation possibilities, attention h0s centrLd 
on the proolem of r~gul~tion and control of fis~ing practices; s~ecif-
i c a 11 y , t h e q u e s t ion h a s a r i s e 1 w h e t i., e r an y n a t i o n 11 a y r e g 1 1 1 a t e f i s h i n g 
activities of foreigners on the high seas. 
Arthur Dean, Chairman of the US Delegation at the 1958 Genevd 
Conference, ref er red to it as '1 one of the most striking accomplishments 11 
of tne conference, and called it 'the first comprehensive international 
legislation,' completed with arbitral procedures, on tne subject. (1) 
Article 1 (1) of Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Kesources presLribes tha all States have the right fo r their 
nationals to engage in fishing on the 111.gh seas only subject to their 
treaty obligations; to the interests and rign~s of coastal States; to 
the provisions concerning conservation of the living resources of the 
high seas. Inherent in tnis Geneva Convention, however , is the concept 
of conservation . All states nave tne 'duty" to adopt, or to cooperate 
w i t h o t h e r St a t e s i n a do p t i n g t h e n e c e s s a y 111 ea s u r l: s f o r t h e cons e r v a t i on 
of the living resources of tt,e n.1.gh seas (Art. 1 (2)). Tne Convention 
also provides in its Art. ~ t~at a 5 ate w1ose nationals a e engaged in 
fishing any stock of fish 'shall' adopt , for its own nationals , measures 
for the conservations of such stocks, and that, if thG nationals of two 
or more Statt .. s are engaged in f · shing the sarne stock, these Jta tes shall 
enter into negotiation with a view to arriving at an agr8ement to pre-
scribe for their respect:ve nationals the necessary ,neasurss for tne 
consGrvation of the stock (Art. 4). It is an Established principle that 
the fishing tate or ~tates n,ay apply co 1servation measures sole~y ,o 
its or their own na ionals. 
(1) A Dean, "The c:neva Conference on t11s Law of the Sea 1 : What was 
accomplish8d: ~2 AJ L. (1_58) pp. G06-627 . 
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An establisl1ed conservation programme may be rendered ineffective, 
however, by the participation of nationals of a State newly entering into 
the fishing of t.1e stocks without any commitmi=nt to observe existing 
regulations. Th8 Convention provides, therefore, that the newcomer 
State is to apply to its own nationals the existing measures which have 
been taken oy o her tisning States. (Art. S). This provision should 
not be construed as p e ri.1 it ting t I e fishing State or States to ex e 1 c is e 
jurisdiction over the ndtionals of the new comer States. On the contrary, 
the new c omer State is bou nd tu enforce exi sti ng conservation me asu res as 
against its own nationals. This heavy obligation is imposed upon all 
thL States adhering to this convention solely to conserve, &s effectively 
as possible, fishery resources of the high seas. The United 3tates 
preferred that the Convention included a provisior1 establishing the 
do c t r i n e o f n a o s t en t i on 1' a s a r tJ le f i r, tern a t i o n a l law • ( 1 ) T 11 a t 
doctrine is to the effect that where a nation or nac.ions have invested 
time and caµital in the development of a fisnery in a particular stock 
of fish or area of the sea, nations which have not formerly fished that 
stock, or nave noL cone ibuted to t:ie develo rent of the area should 
abstain from, ishing there 1n he future. The doclrine is one of con-
servation and of equity. It was pro1,1ulgated and expldined at the 
Conference by the United States and other nations in the sincere belief 
that its aooption would be in furtherance of tt1e mut ual goal of con-
servation. However, some countries including Soviet contended that 
this doctrine contravenes the freedom of the seas and is directed 
against econo mically unde -developed countries. Professor , Lee Han-Ki 
contends that as far as States of us, GSS~ , Canada and iBd China are 
( 1 ) E W A 11 en , 'A r. e w Concept for Fisher i c- ~ Treaties " 4 6 A J I L ( 1 9 5 2 ) p • 319 
Cu Solak, 'The ~roposed Int~rnat1onal Convention tor thL High ~eas 
risheries 45 AJIL (1952) p . ~:3 
S Yamamoto Th8 Ao~tention Principle and ILs ielationship to Lhe ~volvin g 
International Law of the Sea (wniversity of W shington Law Kt view) Vol 
4.J (F167) p. 4J 
F C G Arffiador , op ciL pp b3-6J 
Doug ~as f I Johns ton, op ci t pp 2" 9-297 
- 23 -
concerned Japan has followed the doctrine of aostention oy giving up 
the tradi ionnl principle of freedom of tne high seas. ,~e verthe less 
Japan refJsed to auipt this doctrine soLely against korea. Obviously 
that is nnt cr.:.cket and the fishery policy of Japan is totally based 
on t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t o g y 1 1 i c ti c au s e d t h e fa i l u re rJ f f i s h e r y 2 gr G em e n t 
between two countries. That is tJhy Urn unJ. la tE ra l rneasu re of the rlhee 
Line was U~<lvo·~a 1 e . 1) 
Tne bigge::-t c a,1ge f am ttie existing .:. au1 provided for in the Geneva 
Convention is the primacy end initiative given t~e coastal Statf in case 
o f d ;_ s µ u t e be twee n t h e S t a e s i n t e r e s t 8 d in a r a r t ::. c u .=1 r f i s 11 e r y • 
Inste~d of pla8ing ~hose States uhich have done substantial fishing on 
a par wit', tne coastal St'3tEi, the Conventi n ec~gni ze s that trie coastal 
S ta t e I ia y ; s a u e reg , 1 a t i o ,., s f o r t Id , 1 e in c d - e o f di s a g re e ·1 en t , w hi 1 e 
the other Statrs concerned are limited to ch"'l e ,ging the prop iLty of 
t ti e co as ta l S ta t e ' s a c t i u n t h r o u g' A r t c 1 e 9 o f t n a a r b i t r .., t i o n p r o ·· 
cedure. Thus , the Co,ve -ition sets I orth 8 new concept cif the ·'spec ial 
interests 0 f tie coastal State . T,e c astal State , whose rati~na's 
m_y r:ot ever be engaged in fist-ir:g off its , asts (beyo,1d its national 
jLTisdiction), is Bntitled to participate with othe fishing .:::tdtes in 
any cons2rvation meas ire applicab P to off-shore f..:..s, eriGs krtlcle D). 
The wirlth of thGss off-snore dreas in w~ich the coastal State ls en-
titled to cldim spec·a1 interBsts I is nJwher~ provided fo r in the 
GP.neva Sonvention . If 1egotiations 'that e int_r,stej powers na ve 
not l ed to an agreem( nt within six mr,nths, the c astsl State is also 
empower':.ld to adopt un1 lateral ,11eas .... res' (A1 t · cl e 7) labelled .... "radical 
departure 11 i'r'Jm tha priric.ip';,; of freedom of the seas. 
( 1) Lee Hdn-Ki, ihid. rl • 3:2 
Kym Lhong-300 , lb_d . µp 6.11 
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6. THE 196S AGREEII ~.T 01 , ~-I.:n1ERIES 3ETWEEN 
Th[ 1iEl=-'lJJLIC JF f 0 .-L:::A ANO JAPMN 
Arter two dee de s of a ntogo ni ~m 2nd r osti l e relations following 
worl d dar II, n J Lne 2 · , ~9G5 t he RLJ K - nd Japan f in 3lly t,ok a step 
tow •rd f riendly and normal relations by signing t 1e Treaty on Ba sic 
Re lations ond other agreements in Tokyo. The suspicion existed among 
Koreans, however, that normal relations would again bring the HOK under 
Japan's economic and political domination. (1) On the other hand, the 
opposi ion µarty in Japan found it un f easible at that point for Japan 
to select from L.he divided nation of k.orea he Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) as its friend. Uvercoming opposition within bo ,1 their parlia-
ments, the Government of t he RGK and Japan Bdch succeeded in securing 
the majority necessary to ra 1fy th8se documents. The instruments of 
ratification were exc hanged in Seoul on Dec. 18, 1965. ~eestab · shrnent 
of relations between Seoul and Tokyo is obviously a rnajor development 
in Asia if not world diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Korean-Japanese 
Fis heries Ag eement is even more significan f am the v~ewpoint of the 
international law of ~he Sea. (2) 
(1) frnw York Times, 1-\pril 4, 1 6S, p. 9 col 4; Apr 17, p. 2 col. 2; 
Apr 19, p. 7 col. 1. Aug 1S, 1So5 p. S col 1. 
In Seoul, For example, iL was charged tn a t ~resident ParksGovernment had 
sold OUL. Kored to Ja an, and in Tokyo tr,e Agreeme n ts wer8 denounced as 
part of a scheme by the uSk to for an agg ess1ve alliance in northern 
Asia. The rapp oachment ~lbo caused formation of a '~ational SLruggle 
Committee against Hurni iat1ng t.hplornacy toward Japdn 1 rieaded by the 
former I\ o r Lan r n, side n t Yoon 8 o e - ::i u 11 , w Ii c h c 11 a r g e d l. ll at the po s i ion 
vis-a- is Japan constituted a ulasphemy of the patriotic forefat 1ers 1 
and errned he Rhee Line 'the Li e Line of our fisnerm8n and 'Defence 
Line ' of the nation an d ' we s~all protect the Peace Line to the death~ 
However, 1n tile a sence of rne ribers of Oppos.1..tion Par y, l·1injung Oa r g, 
t h e A g re em en t s we re r a t i f 1 8 d on Aug 1 4 , 1 9 ~ 5 , b y t h e Ko re a n I·, a t ion a l 
Assen bly by a vote of one- ,undrew and ten t:J zero with one ubstention. 
The 11ir jung Dang leyisla ors declared Lhe ratificdtlon 'null ancJ void' 
and ''unconstitLtional' ana stated r1at they would seek a court injuncticn 
suspending the effect of the vote. 
(L) D w Bowett, ibid p. t:8 The Fisheries Hgresrr.ent is syste11at1c of 
whaL can be done by c reful corn rise. 
(1) C01JSE.t1VI-ITION 11EASURES 
I\Jow the Fisheries Agreement between two co u nc.ries ca111e i nto ex st-
ence , which is composed of th e full text of ten ArtiG es and dn Ann1:1x . 
There a e also four Exctdnge of Notes conce ning (d) the S raight 
Baseline of th e lie p ublic of Korea , b) he Fisheries Zone of the ,lep uolic 
of Korea , (c ) ld-Jn t if icatio, 1 l·larki n gs , and (d) Co-ape at ion of Fi s heries , 
which were a g reed to . In addition , Agreed inutes regarding he Ag ree-
r10nt on Fi s neries between 1~J K and Japan , he LettE:Jrs c. xchanged c.:rncern-
ing Sa f e Operatiori , an d tne State ents of the f,inister Fo r Foreign 
Affairs and the f ini s ter fo r hg1icullure and Fa estry of Japan , and the 
State r.1 ents of the IHnister of Foreign Affairs and the , ini s ter of 
Agriculture a n d Fi s hery of the Republic of Korea were publisr1ed . Fu t h er-
rn ori::, , a non- gave ·nmer,tal l-igreer1e nt was sig n i:, on Uec 'i 7, 19 63 b1:1 ween 
he Gre a t Japar, Fis h er i es Institu .. e nd c. h e C1:;11 al Lomri,i'tee of rish-
eries Cooperative ' n i on of tt e Republic uf r-.orea . deals with the 
safe operation and t , e maintenance of order among ile fishing vessel s 
of both flags . And witi1 the coming i to effect of the Fi s heries Agree-
ment , Ja p an reno u n c ed all claims for damages of all Ja p anese fishing 
vessel s an d their crews that had been seized by ~or~a . 
The Fisheries Ag reer,1ent stipulates , in theµrean,bh, , the mainten-
ance of the maximum sustainable productivity of the fishery resources in 
the waters concerned , t , eir consbrvat~on and their ational exploitation , 
resp e ct "or the principle ., f freedom of t~1e h1g11 seas , Jliminatio n uf 
di s putes arisi 1g from f' s hing operations , nd LOOµe r ation fo r tne devsl-
opinent of fis~1eris , . It shoul c b8 ,ioted , ho wevGr , tt dt the wo rding; 
1tcorfirming that the ,.J r in ple o f t ,e freeJom of the high seas shall be 
respect e d urle ~s 1th6r wise sµecif Cdlly pro ~i e d in the pres&,t ~gree-
men t • 11 S J c h wor d i n g is no e f j gu1 of SpbGcn , but J f g eat 
imr,ortanco , especi a lly to :apc.n in t 1P l.1g11t of t he i,Jre s e r t s it uation 
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in wh.:.ch, althr1ugh tf-ie r1ain purpose of the Fisheri1;,s Agree1nent was to 
settle the dispute between tne RGK d'ld Japan arising from tor"'a's 
unilateral prohib:tion of fishJries on the high seas on tne basis Jf 
Pre·~idential r rocl-·mation , fo. lowed by t11e Ldw for the Constirvation of 
Fishery lies urces, and fron the .:.gnJring uf tt1e ~,1ee L1rie by Japan , the 
above-mentioned two ~residential Decrees has -at been nfflcially abJl-
ished oy reasun of the national deferice . 
The main spirit and theme runni,g through conse.2vat1on measures 
between Geneva Corference and t,1e HOK-Japan r1gr •einer" "1re tho sane in 
v.:.ew or the act that .JO h propo . .md 1& mair t nance of tr,e maxi11u'Tl 
sustained productivity of e fishrry resources . T~e neces~1ty of joint 
cons 0 rv,.,tion r'ea~11res ,asco e o be widE ly r~cagn..Lzed . The Truman 
Procla,n-ti'ln (''8 58pt . 194c; 1 drew particular <.Jtten i;,n to this reed f'lr 
thP first time. The drsira il.:.ty of r aintainirig marine .. esources at 
hei · r,ax1r1um sustai11able yield is co111m:1n y concedE?d . 
c~tegorically object to corservatior1 rneasurrs , s1nce tne goal f con-
servation 1s trJ serve t,1e comrion i'lter sts of all natio s , namely, the 
rriaximum supply Jf Foo~ for hur1an consumrtio~. lJhdtever the modi? o f 
e·p ecsion may be, the maintenance of the maxi~um sustainable yie,d of 
~he atock 1s always ne Pinal goal of all tne conventi,ns. 
np-19 J'Jint Regula ion Zone I nuts1de :.he t..XClu""iV8 12-mile "'i s hery 
zo e was es~ablished between kurea ard Japan fr ~he purpose of t1e 
conservation of ~he living resource- of t he h~gh SPdS . 
enni 1 fear sh'Jwn by K~rean GovernMent was h,w to ass •re sufficient 
protection o marine fauna dg in~t ~busive expln1t~ti-n a~d in~iscrimin-
te fishing by Japan8se fishing vessels using s0p•,ist1cated fishi~g 
yrare . This joint control ZJne, the second ~r~a fJr which Article II was 
made in the rgreement, encomp2&ses high se-s wh"ch ars far less cxten°iva 
in scope than t,,osG 1nclt·oej in t e dhee Line, OL t in essence grants 
preferential fis inCJ rig'lts to l.orean tisherrien in vie of the amount 
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of catching fish and the number of fishing bats a 1d units . ~rovisional 
f i s f1 e r y con t r o l m e -1 s u r e s des c r i b e d i ri t 1, e An ex C, ha 11 b c:: en r o r c a d in 
thJs joint c ont o zone until co"se-v tion ragulation s necessary for 
~aintaining t ~e max ~mum sLst ineJ productivity Jf fish8IY re s our c es ha ve 
been implemented on the basis of scientific research . These temporary 
controls , which are li s ted in Article III , pertain to dragnet fishin g 
and surrounding net fis11ing , and ~o mackerel angling by vessels of more 
than sixty tons. An Annex which forms an intt.ig al par~ of the Agreement 
lists the rest ictions in greats detail . lhe maxir11um number of boats 
of less than fifty tons is confined to or,e hundred an d fifteen ships 
per day (Annex , Art 1 (a)) . In the eastern area , craft of more than 
fifty tons are restricted to a total of two hundred and seventy vessels 
from ~ovember to Ap il and limited to one hunu ad from ~ay to Octobe r 
(Annex , Art . 1 (b) (i , ii)) . T s numoer of surrounding nets (seine 
fishing) wh ict1 may be used is also circ~ms riued to sixty fis1ing units 
eacn between January 1G and May 15 , and to one hundred and twenty unit s 
between May 16 and January 15 of each season . (Anndx , A t . 1 c) (i , ii)) 
The Annex perm.1 ts fi f taen vesse s , w ig rung not less than si x ty ons a 
piece , to catch macK8rel during t 1e last seven mont1 s ( frorn June to 
December) of tht::: year within certain of the wac.ers (Annex , Art . 1 (d)) . 
It also regul 6tes the tonnage of the fisning vessels (Annex , Ar t. 2) 
t h e s .1. z e a f I 1 e r,1 e s h ( A n n ex , f-1 r t • 3 ) , an d t h e b r i g h t n e s s a f t l 1 e t i s h -
luring lights (f-\nnbx , Art . 4) , and deals with tl1u Ct3 L.lfi cdtes 
an d identification markings (Ar1n8x , Arr. . 5) whicn rnust be carried oy 1,lie 
c raft which opera e in the Joinc.. ceint al zones . Tht.:: form ano position 
of the s e identifi cation markings are oascr1bed more f ully i n Nutes 
ex c 11 an g e d can cu r rently with the as i c ins i.. r u 111 en t. • Al t ha ugh the Ann e x 
stip ulate s that th e for~going pro visi ona l regula ion mea su re s fo r 
fisne ie;s s~all apply to boLh pa rties , Lh e ~o ean fishermen have actually 
recei ved preferential t eatment . Indeed , A ticle 1 e) of tne Annex 
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states that as long as the differences between the fishing capabilities 
of the two sides remain, the number of fishing boats or units allowed 
Korea shall be adjusted through consultations between the parties. 
In such discussions account shall be taken of these variations and the 
maximum number of vessels and units listed in the Annex, in other 
words permitted the Japanese, shall serve as a criterion. ( 1) The 
Japanese fishing techniques are, of course, far superior to those of 
the Koreans , and Japan has some 383,000 fishing vessels, many of which 
operate with modern equipment, as against 42,217 Korean boats of 
which only 6,107 are motor-operated. (2) Obviously, then, the closi 1g 
of these gaps is at best a long range goal. The Agreed Minutes recog-
nizes this fact and includes a further advantage for the Korean fisher-
men. Article 2 (a) of the Agreed Minutes sets the Japanese catch in 
the jointly regulated zone at 150,000 tons annually with a ten percent 
fluctuation margin, yet places no restrictions on the Koreans although 
there is the detailed breakdown of this amount of 150,000 tons for 
Japan. This amount is divided not according to the species of fish, 
but rather on the basis of tonnage of the vessels, that is, 10,000 tons 
for drag-net fishing by fishing vessels of less than 50 tons, 110,000 
tons for seine fishing and for mackerel-angling fishing by fishing 
vessels of not less than 60 tons, and 30,000 tons for drag-net fishing 
by fishing vessels of not less than 50 tons. This standard annual total 
haul (150,000 tons) also serves as an indicator in regulating the total 
(1) Annex, Article 1 (e) stipulates that while there exists a difference 
in fish-catching capability between fishing vessels of Japan and of the 
Republic of Korea, the number of fishing vessel s or units in operation 
of the Republic of Korea shall be adjusted through consultation between 
the governments of the two Contracting Parties, with the maximum number 
of fishing vessels or units in operation provided for in the present 
Agreement as a standard and paying due regard to such difference. 
(2) Korea Times, March 26, 1965 p. 2 col. 3; ibid Apr. 10, 1965 p. 2 
col. 4. 
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nur,ber of vcssJls and units which may engage in fishing op:rations. 
Bot~ gov8rnments must, therefore, provide their flsnermen with adminis-
trative guidance to \eeµ ttie actual total ratch within tnc maximum 1rs,uOO 
tons (15[,002 tons WlLh allo wdnce of ten ~ercent u wards or downwards) 
e ven during the fishing seasons. 1-\rLic 1 2 (c) of t 1e Agr..,ed f1inutas 
s t c1 t e s t t, a t b o t h go v e r nm 0 n t s s r a 11 tab u l a t e t h e i r c a t c h in on t h 1 y , on the 
basis 1 f rep o rts submitted by th~ir own ishing V8ssels a id as a result 
o f surveys mada at la'"lding port~ , and subrn~t th8 lists to ~ach otncr 
qua terly. Thus, once the quota has b8 n met, t e Jap anbse wi ll be 
barred from further activities in the joint control zone. 
Conservation measures in the Jojnt regulation zo~e a- prescribed in 
the Ann8x are uasically an ortho c ox cons-rvation medsure ap~lic ble to 
both part'e"' , s • eh as the size of f.1sning Vc: ssels, 11e3h size "'Ind power 
of fi s "-luri 19 ights. Howe ver, the Geneva Conferenced d not dt~em~t 
to lay dowi1 specific, co'"lcrete conserv i:1 \,ion rulE.s 1 ··-e nLK-Japan Fishery 
Ag reer,1en t. Th :-:> Gen ' Va Convention slso do - s 1ot pecify the 1istance fror.i 
t~e coast ~t whic!1 co'"lserv~tivL measJrLs - ~y ue taken, and nothing pre-
vents s~atu c:: fron1 agreeing among and f r t ,e1ns8lvrs on d rt:lstricted 
f' shing zone :i.r1 waters " hich ar' µart of the high seas . 
2) THE tl;G r RI CIPLl 1 ) 
T~e prea,11ble of the 1-\gre ment confir11s the , artie I respect ~or 
the principle of freedom of the hi Ii seas, unless pee ficol~y circum-
scribed by its terms, an d A ticLe IJ urthers this objective. T~is 
( 1 ) D 1, Harr ~. s ''Ca s" s and I 1"' t er i s ls on In t e: r n at i Jn al Law 11 ( Lon d n 1 9 7:? ) 
p. 346. 
r C I J ~sports (L~tus Case) ~eri~s • No . "G 1927 1 p 6t-65 . 
:) P O'Co'ln'"'l , 1 Interratio11a~ Lai. 1 (Lo'1don, 1970) Val I r., p.6 18-'"11. 816. 
H Lauterpacht, 'O~pe'lheim 1 s International Law" (Lorg an 197G) pp. 513-5n6 
: J ColonbJs , 'Intcr~at anal L w oft e Sa (L ng dn 1gs~) ~P· 7"l3-7S8 76~- 7 7~ . 
J A ''.Jcze' , ' F 1 ags of C..,nveni ric- 1 (H rv rd Lniv,rsily r-ress 1962)pp . 91-1?4 
F VG A dcior, op c·t. pp. 18-2? 
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provision g~vf s conlrJl and jurisd:ction over Fishing buats outsioe lt1e 
exclusive 12-raile fishing zone to the State to which the vessel belongs. 
(1) The rights of control include those of stopping and inspecting the 
ship which shall be exerc sed only by the flag State. Japar strongly 
advocated this principle. Because Japanese still keep vivid memory of 
bitter experience in which a number of ]cipanese boats were seized by the 
Korean ra vy on tne high seas in tne past 1J yedrs, t is article was 
laid down to avoid a similar inc.ident again in the joint fishery regu-
lation zone. According to Article IV (2) both parties c1re to exercise 
proper guidance and super vi sion to assure tt,e faithful observance of the 
provisional fishery con~rol measures in tne joint control zone by their 
own nationals and fishing craft, and to carry out domestic measures, 
including appropriate penalties, for any violation. The Agreen,ent, tnus, 
incorporates tt1e flag principle of the Geneva Conven ion on the High 
Seas (Articles4 and 5). Artlt.;le 3 of an Agreed f•linutes attached to the 
instrument, howeve , modifies this principle somewhat. It specifies the 
procedures which must be followed fu r the regulation and enforcem8nt of 
the provisional measures in the jointly controlled zone. fhese methocs 
encompass the right of a public official on a pat.rol vessel to 11 notify 
his counterpart that he has a good reason o elieve that a fishing 
craft of the o ht:1r side is clearly violating the provisional regulation 
rn ea sure s f o r fisheries • Upon receipt o f this not i f i c a t ion , w rn c h must 
b e ' re s p b c t e d '' , t he s us p e c t e d f i s hi n g v e s s e l rn us t b e ins p e c t e d b y i t s 
own surveil ance ship which must exercise authority over it, and the 
government of tile other party shall u& informeu of r.,1e measures which 
have been taKen as a result of this action. Reconnaiss6nce ships of the 
( 1 ) A rt i c 1 e 6 of the 1 9 :i 8 G en e v a Co n v en t i o 1 on t r I b H i g h J ea s : Ship s •••• 
shall be subJect on the high SBdS to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
~tate to which they belong. 
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two parties may also cruise around a fL, u.ng boat in mutual cooperation 
( j o i n t p a 1. o l ) , and in a y rn a .l. n ta i n c 1 o s e con tac w i t 11 each o the r i n 
accordance with prior consultations between tneir officials, in order to 
make their policing smooth and etfect.ive. Puulic officials, oreover, 
may board each other's patro· boats if a request is made by one govern-
ment to th~ other. But such a demano n,ust be considered as µroper. Wilen 
requ£:Jsted by one government, maximum cooperation as much convenience as 
possible for the inspection) will be given by lhe OLher for purposG of 
surveying the enforcer.ient 1,,easures within its territory (Article 3 (c) of 
Agreed 11inute). Inspect1un by he ot.1er party Cdn thus tdke place at 
such landirig ports tne two treaty partners have designdted in accordance 
wit h Article 2 (b) of the Agreed 1•1inute, but not at the scene of the 
fishing operations like Article 1U (1) 0f the Convantio,1 ror the Hi h 
Seas F.l.sner.l.es of tn8 ~urLr1 ~acific Ucban~ w ~en WdS sig d at Tokyo in 
1 9 5 2 and en ere d in to I or c e i ri 1 S 5 3 be wee n U J t-1 , Ca ,1 a a and .::, d pan • ( 1 1 
Finally, Article 6 of t,e Ag ead ~,inute provides tha the Koroan and 
Japanese surve1:lance ships exc,1ange information on the status of fishin g 
operations in the joint regulation zone. In such instances t •e vessel 
which receives the request must comply with it to the extent that it is 
able to do so. 
Article 9 of the Agreed l'linute grants ''innocent 
passage to vessels in tar itorinl waters and sea areas concerning 
fisheries in ac o dance with int8rnational law. In tne case of fishing 
1) 4 UST 38C (195~ 1 , espe~lally pp. 3da-389. 
T 1e ,\r .. 1.c]e 1'"' 1 J prJv1de t,,at, if a ve ,sel uf o e of the part.l.ec" is 
f ou r;d in waters in which th8 abstention e9ime applies, Urn dUtnorized 
officials uf any par1-y ray bo tr1t:; craft, exc1rni e t--; records nd 
question t e per.so,rnol (~rt. 1LJ 1) (c)). If the vess l is a'"'tually 
cngwgec., i,, op'"'ra ions which violat'-'- t',e Conv-r1tion or sus ecb.-d on 
reasonable Jrou1ds of 1a vin _ done 30 imrneulcJt ly bef orenand, t,18 offic-
ials ay ae:;sert t,1e person"' responsibl and seize t-,e ves sel an d d tain 
them until delivered to tne appropriate authorities of th e party involved 
(Article 1U ( ~) b)). Lnly t e l attL may try t~e o f e ce and impose 
pen .. ties (Artie's 1 (1) (cJ). 
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boats the innocent passage 1s restricted to instances in which, in a 
similar wr.1y to the 1q5G C r1v nti,n, all uf its Fis ling equ;pment has 
been placed in st.,rage . Article 14 (5) of t,,e Convention on the 
Territ1rial Sea prov1d8S ~hat ~dssage of foreign f~shin, ves·els shall 
not be considered innrit,;ert if h8y 'io not observe regul.a1tion•· of the 
coastal State , which prevent haseve 0 se 1 s fro, fishing in the Lerritorial 
sea . 
Innocent. 1assag is c nor1 al co"'sequence of freeJorn of n~vigc:1t.i.01 , 
u t t t I e r i g I I t o f pa s a g e i s a r i g h t w hi c h f o 11 ~ w s f r o m t h e c ·, a a c t e r -
izatio~ of the w-te: and not from i~s eJercise adv rsely to th, coa·tal 
State . The 1958 Convention xpres~ed the ~rinrip:e underlying t~e C)rfu 
Ch~nnel decision, namely t •l pa-sage is in,ocent so log as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, goJd order or sec1 r~~Y of he ~oastdl State 
( r icle 14 (4)). The Irternational Court of ]Jstice 1eld in ~he Corfu 
Chan,el Case l.f,at. t in,oce11ce of paesage was n t the c ,aract e :Jf ..,.,., 
ship whic1 was the determir1in':i factor , .Jut rat er the characte of the 
passage itsc f. (1) Tie rignt of i nocent p ssage applies primarily to 
the territor•al seL (Article 14 (1)). It is 1.,~ e right of inn,..,ce,,t 
passage that distinguishes the leg-1 status of territorial w~ters from 
that of nternal waters. H wever , t G rig1 t of pa"'sagL is n'Jt only 
applicable t torritorld waters anQ ~o ewly-enclJsed intorn2l water~ (2) 
~t also appli s to straits conneLtiny wo ~arts of tt1e h;gh seas for 
in .. ernationCJl navigation, w 1 ether or nit they are forned entirt:ly of 
tsrr~torial waters. c~) n Article 9 of th8 Agreed , in te, a right of 
innocent passage exists even in 1r isf-iery zu,es • This Art:c1e · s cate-
']oric, lly inc'Jh rent with r1 t·clE:.14 (1)(4)of tr1e 1C'5J C nvention on the 
~) 1 C J rlep~rt"' ( 'C-,rr u Lhc1nn 1 :ase (191-9)). p. 3'"' 
2) Ar L C-1.'-! 5 11f t-,f1e 1 ::J'.:;8 Convention on he Terri to ial 5ea and the 
Contiguo ws Zone - Tn·s exceptional case may arise where Std t es ~u c h as 
Norway ha ve deeply indented coastal lines or a f inge of coastal i s lands . 
(3) IC J Reports (1949) , i id . p . 28 . 
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Territorial Sea in w.1ich the right of innocent passage applies primarily 
to the territorial sea. Then, do both contracting parties by implication 
consider that "Fishery zones I are identical wi h territorial waters in 
spite of the fact that Korba ,,ever declared the oreadth of the territor-
ial sea until 1)787 
This nebulosity shows that thBr8 exists a high probability of 
different interpretation and estimation on Articlu 9 of the Agreed 
1,inute. (1) 
(3) SETTLEr,E.r T uF OISPUTE (MtHICLc. :j) 
Any dispute over interprela ion and implementation of ths present 
Agreement" is t;:i be settled primarily through diplor,1atic channel 
(Article 9 (1)). If this method proves unsuccessful the differenL.e snall 
be settled tl1rough au noc compulsory arbitraLion by a commis~ion of three 
arbitrators (A ticle 9 (2)). This board is composed of three arbitra-
tors, one to be appointed by each party dnd the tliira to be agreed upon 
by the LWO arbi trato s. tloth yovernri1~nts have agreed to aoide Liy any 
award made LJy t-his arLJi Lration board (,-;rticle '::i ( :::i)). This arbitration 
clause is uni~ue; only tne luropean Convention on F1st1eries of 1964 has 
similar provisions in its Article 13 an d Annex II, Artl.cle 15. Any 
dispute concerning tne " interpretation or appl.i.cation of the present 
LuropGan F1she1iec; Convention ' shall be undertaken first lnrou91 the 
method o r peaceful settlemenl l~rt. 13). h~n this fails an ad hoe 
compu sory arbitration compoQed or five arbitrators shdll settle th 
disput.e _,ub111i t Led 1..0 it. lach of the c.;or,tracting par tie;;s stiall comply 
with the award ot the Arb.1.trdl Tribunal in ar,y di s pute to which it is a 
party (Annex II Art. 1S) 
(1) h.ym Cnong- oo, 1t.Jid. pp • ...,-4 
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The 19J8 Gent3va Conventiun un Fishi11g anu Lo n serval, io I uf .... h8 
L..Lving Ii sources also containsµrov1sions on compulsory settlement of 
difforence.J, oy special commission, dmong the states concerning the 
conservation of fishery rt::jsuurces u11less the µarties concerned agree to 
seek a solution uy the µeaceful met, od, t, dt is, by 1-\.i. t1cl8 3 of the 
Char~er of the United ~ations. The µrovision (1-1rl,1cle 9) calls for thl:l 
estaLlisnmenL of ad hJC com~issi~ns to ue knuwn as ~pecial ummission
11 
of f_;_v~ members. In t. 8 case o f-lartios Lo th6 C:o,1ventio , , riJsort to 
the '' spec.:. al co1111111 ss .:.on , 1 s ob 1 i ga tu ry and ti 1e decisions f heir 
budil:ls ar8 bi diny upon t11e dispu ants concernea and t 1e provis.:.ons uf 
pd r~gr ph 2 of i.. r ticle ::14 of c.i1e Ci1c:ir er u f I.; 1e United i,at.iu'ls si 1'"11 be 
applicdble to trios decisions , rt..LC.1.8 11) . /-\ spec.ial commissJ. rn w.ill 
be L;O we11ed only to pas.:.. upon the 'nece.::;s1ty of conservaLJ.on c1nd ~ne 
'rea:::ona.Jle, ess or concrete cor,Sbr at1un nea"'ure~, 1-nL.cl 1 U) . 
Realization of he e,bjectiv~s of the µre ent 1-\g.ree enL is die ta k 
a f t 1 , Ru" - - a pan Jo ... n F is i, er i e.., Lo m 111 .i. s s · on w hi r, is _ o m ...is d of two 
nationc.l s ctl ns, eac 1 of wt,icn consists of t ,ree rnl:lmbe::,rs and a stand-
ing secretar1dt Art~cle b} . T e L.:w1nmi Slwn, for wnich olJ.uWuf1C8 is 
1t1ade in Artic 1 e G ,r L,18 rlgrcemEJnt , .1e1,Ls at lea"t arinual l y, nd it s 
resoluti n, recorn 1endati...Jn S ._,rid otl1Er dec~s ... oris 1e mad on y by agree-
rn en t be t we 8 n L r E:: n a l, i o n a 1 s e c 1.. i L 11 s • The racumm~ndatitns ad" by tll8 
Commiscion sh~u doer spe t~d Lo tne exten pu s"ble by the con ractir19 
part-ies. T' e Com111i-siun is e mpowe red o P' r-urm "'8V81' l , unct~ons. 
(ArL cl" 7) . ThesP involve the riyht to s bmi ec m111endatil.lns to tnf::l 
par• ies regarr11ng ,.,tie s cientif .ic r S8drc-h W, eh ""llUUld '1e undertdk n 
f~r the ~urpose f studying th e f"s er~ res~urcf::l~ in wd•ers uf their 
commo 'l in+er~st a d cc,r1cern1ng Lhe control r1ea u e s whic h should b e 
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adopted in the jointly restricted zone as a result of such findings. 
And, whenever the need arises, this organ may review matters related to 
the provision2l fishery controls and present suggestions to the parties 
on steps to be taken in consequence of these deliberations. These steps 
may include revision of the provisional regulation measures for fish-
eries. The Commission may also study and recommend enactment of a 
schedule of penalties for violations of the instrument, may examine 
problems on safe operations and order among fishing craft and general 
policies for settling collisions, and may offer appropriate comments 
on these issues. Moreover , this body may make recommendations on the 
scope of the joint resources survey zones. In fact the zone for the 
first joint resources survey zone was recommended by the Commission at 
its first session in 1966. On the basis of these submissions, the ex-
tent of these zones and the studies to be conducted within them shall be 
determined through consultation between the two contracting parties. 
Provision for the zones, the third body of waters described in the 
Agreement, is made in Article 5 which stipulates that these areas shall 
be established outside of the jointly regulated grounds. 
(5) STRAIGHT BASELINES (1) 
In the preparation of negotiations between two countries Korea has 
expressed willingness to end the application of the Rhee Line as a con-
servation regulation, and has suggested a forty-mile exclusive fishing 
area, which she subsequently modified in favour nf a joint control zone 
(1) DP 0 1 Connel, op cit. pp 476-78 
George Schwarzenberger , "A f"lanual of International Law" (London, 1967) 
pp 509-511 
Brierly, "The Law of Nations" (Oxford University Press, 1963) pp 198-199 
F BG Armador, op cit. pp 51-59 
SA Swarztrauber, op cit. pp 188-190, 227-28, 218-19 
Donat Pharand, "The Law of the Sea of the Arctic" (University of Ottawa 
Press, 1973) pp 69-79. 
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cuupled with a f ishirig monc1µuly Del t of tw1:dvt:: miles; Japan iias moved 
from a tt1ree-~1le limit LO a six-plus-six formilla, propuseu a unified 
zone s y s ten, a n d a cc 8 p t e J , e v 0 n i f on l y a l i m i t e o b a s i s , t h e s t d i g h t 
bas e lint:: met hod. Japdn , as in ttit:: 811 ~ corisent-t:::d to a twelve-milt: t::"'1..,lusive 
f isi,ery ut::.:.L dr J urid f\ urean coaSl..S c:1r1u, as a resu..1.1,, nas in essGr1 c e 
acceptt:id tituse I dCBLb u f t l,e applicaul o 1-'roµu:::dl::; wni~11 i1ad rect::ived Lh e 
widest suppDL' t d L drn 1 9 5 [;, Ge,-,evd Cu n ferar,ces a 11d hds dt least ac' now -
ledgeu t-11t:: rt::gimt:: of tht::J 19 64 Euroµec:1n Fis i1eries Lonve n tion Art.icle 2 
to 6). Llearly t ,e inability of the Geneva Confereric8sto reach agreement 
on the breadt h of tile territorial sea and c.,n f isi,ing rig h ts uegan the 
march towar..d t h e sea and seriously cncilleng8o the doctr .... ne 'J f the thrGl:3-
mile fishing zo n e. (1) 
Article 1 of the ROK-Jaµan Agreement on Fis ,eries r l; cogn..:.zes t h e 
right of t- h e t wo powers to establish a t welve-milt:: fishing z o ne ~t,ich 
. 1 a y o e m e a s w re d e i t he r f r o 111 t h e b a s e 1 i e s o r i n a c co r d n c e w i t I 1 , e 
straight uaseline metr,u J . when 1;;; ve straigh~ oa...,elines are adop t ed, 
consult a ti o n::; must ue h e d wilh t e other µarty (Art.i. ~le 1 sa y s that 
••• 11 eitil f' r Lo tracling P::i rty she 11 dete r rnir,e such st-raigh t uas1::lir1e 
t iP·ough co n sultat.io 1, wit r, L 1a utner Luntractin g Pa ... t.y. 1 ). 
bot L techniques Wc:lr8 emp .: oyLd aroun o t h e Ku l eun pen.i.nsula. 
ln ,i ract:.ice 
On tt1 east 
coast the d8limi t aLi Ln WdS undertak non Lhe b ~s1s o f Lhe low~r wat&r 
::..ine formula. Straig 1t oaseli. ,es o __, ng.1tu 1e lines werl; drawn around 
ttie we s tern an d soutn-1rn coa - ts of Kor e c::1. An t.xe,hd n ge of i-ote , signed 
on i:. ,e s rnt:: day as t-118 r\greem G,1t-, escrl ~es l..11es bastl..1..~nes f ..., r tr1e 
wesb,,rn SJ.de d ,1 d s' dtes that ,e iwte cu11s t-i tutes ... ne apµroval requ1reo 
by Article 1 (1) of the main Agreerne r t. I n t he so u tt1 , ..: ~ e c u a ~ t u f 
• hich i ric 1 udt::ts "Ch'"'-Ju-Oo ls 1_an rl ur LJUE:!lpart t ..1..fty 1111les off the south 
coast, , orea·s largest .island and s , a1lest provinct., conside:::ed in t,1is 
(11 S A :3wa ztrauber, op c1t. 5--e C,1apt r 1 
T n re e - l'I i 1 e L i m i t JJ p 2 L, - L'. 5 1 • 
, t lit::: Ut:1m.:.s8 of Lhe 
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country ciS a p~dCG of wind, worr1._.n and stones' (~ar11 Ua) which abounc.Js 
with !egands or dragons ~nd 3irnµle primitive de1t.1es (especia.1.1y three 
fami y ndme s Jf Koh , t3oo arid Yang), tl1e both parties agree:! on longituce 
lines . Tile Second t..><cnangb of OLLS, acco,npanyin~ the grea1,11::1nt and 
const1Luti,19 d su1-1µler,1antd y ,;_Jgr ernent provio;:;s ,or tnese lines, which 
are of a prov191onal nature pending a final de111arcdtion around east 
nnd west uf "Che-Ju-Do I::.lc:1,,d. h1::1s li,,es, Wlli'-:tl were l,118 SUOj8Ct 0 
i11lensive n egotiations, were t or;1Bd, firsl,, by J_;in.ing the points 
3 3 O 1 a f 1 5 II n Or L 1 at~ t U e, 1 2 /-' 21 f ea St 10 n ,::J 1 t .._de , .J 3 O 4 / I .) r If n Orth 
0 at1tu""e, 127 1J east lo11gi'c.ude and the poin Lwelve naul,ical miles Jue 
east of 'Udo I Island on t le 1::1dstern s.1de, a,,d sec_,nd, uy straignt line 
linking the follow.ing points 33°.Jb 1 2 1 nur_r, lat.itude, 125°55 1 3 1 east 
10 ,gituue c.ond tria .i.ntereaci.,ion f :::u 0 _4 1 20' nortn, 1_5"5b 1 2u' e_st on 
the west. In t.,e eastern Sl::lction of 1Ltrn· Ju-Do , Jdpan, ... 11erc:by agre d 
o a straight north-suut,1 bor er whicn em rac ..... s 1.ne C. ,e-.::iu-Oo' and the 
wdters ~etween it and the Karban peninsula, ad was drawn considerabiy 
further to the Bdst than she had origin~lly intbnded. On Lie western 
si de trie exc.1usive fish.1 g zone wdS slig,1tly curveJ inwaru so as not to 
e ;1 c 1 o s e 1- o o 111 u c o f t h e h .: g h se as • Japan inc1s ad on t1is iJentation 
in orde not to pr Judice her µ0~1tion ~s a major ~isning na ion ·n h~r 
relations with othe1 cuast -1 states . T ,le del im1 a tion, never die 1 ess, 
s als of f a large body of water t.h1ch under t1,e lower-wat2 mark fo r .. 1ula 
would be regarded as µart of the aper se~ • 
...,y111uo::.1ca ... ly the derndrcation form' an odd-shapl::ld vus • Tl1i& fi.gure is 
somewhat different fro, .. t e o e wh.:.c1, au u ig1n lly Je n proiJosad by 
koroan Agric~llural-For_stry Ministe kyun-hi T hah 1n h.:s conf~rer1ccs 
w.i.th his oppo::;L,e nu .. 1tn:1r, !•lunenuri 1-\k gi. f, e p opusc:il fir st advanced b/ 
Tc 1ah resemble an inverter1 µy a;ilid it I L"' base faci g ro rt. ,. This 
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was later modified to assume the shape of a mug, thus closing an angle, 
but Akagi preferred a vase with a narrow neck out of deference to the 
sinuos~y principle. 
The proper fixing of a baseline is most important because it 
determines how far seaward a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction over 
a certain breadth of territorial waters beyond the baseline, as well 
as over the continental shelf which begins outside the territorial waters. 
It may also affect the extent of contiquous zone for purposes of customs, 
fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations, since such zones may extend 
up to 12 miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured (Article 24 of Convention on the Territorial and Contiquous 
Zone). The baseline of territorial waters has become significant also for 
the implementation of a new type of contiguous zone, namely the fishing 
zone. (1) 
Article (3) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention specifies that 
"except where otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line 
along the co a st as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by 
the coastal state." It is obvious from this provision that baselines 
should follow the sinuosities of the coast except in the special cases 
provided for in the Convention. There are four special cases covered; 
(1) across the mouth of a river flowing directly into the sea (Article 13), 
(2) across the mouth of a bay when the closing or straight baseline does 
not exceed 24 miles except for historic bays (Article 7), (3) in deeply 
indented coasts (Article 4(1)), (4) and where there is a fringe of islands 
in the immediate vicinity of the coast. (Article 4(1)). 
The drawinq of straight baselines across mouths of rivers and bays 
is not a new development in international law, but not so for the case 
(1) The fishing zone was envisaged by Canada in 1958 Conference as in-
volving an extension of the concept of the contiguous zone (The Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law (1964) Vol. 2, Al Gotlieb, "The Canadian 
Contribution to the Concept of a Fishing Zone in International Law" p. 64 
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of deeply inden ed coasts and coastal drchipelagos. Tnis latter use 
received official sanction for the first tim!:i in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisneri~s Ca&e in 1951. Both tl,e Judg1nenL of the LourL. and Lile Lon-
venLion on Lhe Territorial sea make it quite clear L. at tn~ use of 
s trai gh t bas !:ill r1es is a system of exception and is µ e rmi ssi u l & only in 
cases where the peculiar geugraphy of a coast warrants a departure from 
th8 normal rule of die low-wdter 111a1k along tne siriuusitit:s of l,l1e 
coast. Tne International Court of Jus tic1::: in tnis case describ8d the 
type of coast whic,1 warrantt:~d such a departure in th!:i following t.e.r is 
(11; 'wh1::ire a Codst is uBeply 1.11d1:::11bH.1 and cut i1hu, dS s l,lldt cf 
t. d s t e r n F i r I r11 a r k , o r w I I e r· c:: 1 t l s u u r de red u y a 11 a r c I ii p 1::1 J. d y u s u t I d s L r , e 
skJargac1rd alo119 tne w~SL.!:irn sector uf Lr15 cuast ,i..-re .: (lUBSLiun, l,118 
Udsoline becomes l-1depe11oen oy ,1ear1s uf a yeo 111atic cunstructiun. In 
sue, circu 11scanc:.es 115 line of t11e low-watar mark no longer be put 
forward in all its sinuosities.·1 Those two types of exceptional coast-
lines described by the Court - namely, (a) in r11:::cv1ly indentt...d coasts, 
(b) a fringe of isldnds in the imr11euiate v.,_ci n1 1.,y uf the coast - were 
retained by Lne Law of Sea Confer~nce in 19 
4 of the Lonvention. 
and included in nrticle 
The esse11tial differs, ce betwet:Jn the normal baseline and tna 
straight baseline 1s that ti,e la l.;er is draw 'acr ss water I whereas 
the fwrmer is Jrawn 1a _,ng vflt:l CCldS 1 •' ~) 
The ar_ a of t, ,e rabbi t.-s, 1ap1:::d I\O r<..;d is dJ , 2j6 squc r e 111i lt::!s. rti·s 
is dbouL the area of 1·1 · nnesota or Kansas ::,ta t.e , or of Gr ec bri ain. 
The longes1., distanc_ fror.i nor1.,ll Lo suuth .l.S d u t uO miles and t 1a 
( 1 ) I C J Rep u r t s ( 1 9 v 1 ) H n g lo - ,..., u r w e y .1 d n r 1 s r, c r .i t:1 v as e I pp 1 2 6 -1 2 9 
D H ~uhnsonA JOl I lCL~ (1JJ2) ~ · 145. 
C WaldocK, Ld oYIL ,19u1) P• 14 
u H Harr~s, op c~L. p. ~Ub 
2) bSrald Fitz , aurice, 'The Law and ne Procedure of Lhe ICJ 1 
1 Bfll (1r54) p. 388 . 
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average di~tance from t;,ast to west is aoout 170 miles. There are J , 479 
is· ands , larg"'ly off tne soutr,ern and western co~st . The Korean coast-
lines , es~e c ia ... ly 1n t,,e Yellow Sea anc SouLnern Sed form hea 1ily inden-
ted coasts <::Jeugrapr1ically calL .. d 11 Hic,. 1 tyµe cadet s a, d there is a fringe 
of islands dlong both coasts in th8 vicin·ty of the coas lines . It seem s 
that the ~orLan coautline~ is applicable to the crlse o f minor cur vature 
uf t.1e co.::stline ' . (1) T11e Yellow Sea, tu the wesc. , .nto which principa l 
rivers empty , has an exten~ive continental she_f and tt,e unusually hiyh 
tidal ran::Je of, at µ 1 ac~s , ~hirl,y or thirty-three ft::1et (t e s-- c ond liic;h-
e s t in the worl d), 1ence cue.stretched t1da ... flats d,1d 1any o~fshore 
islandc:, on tht:; west roast. On tt,e other hand, the t:.astern ~ea , also 
known as tl,o Sea of Japan , is deeper , che continental snelf there ending 
rather bluntly , and .,as a tidal range of only a few feet, yet ft::w natural 
t,aruours . In sharp contrast lo 1,e east coc:1st, 1,11e coast lines of the 
w e s t a n d e s p e c 1 a 11 y t il e s o u t I w i t h a p enc ha n t f u r in de 11 ta t 1 on de l in ea t e 
an endless sequence of beaches , uays, yulfs, promonto~ies , mini-penin-
sulas , tile. intermingling with innumeraole uf fs,10re islanas . 
lven t.hough Japan had previously insisted on d,e more traditional 
low-water lint::1 furrnula for measurj_ng sea twunJaribs , sl,t:1 has at H~ast 
pari..icularly recognj_zed tl,at U1e Korean peninsula ln the south and west 
consis s of cunsiotiLc:tbJ.e intJentatiuns c:1nd encompasses num8 ous .islands . 
Hence sne has agreed to a st.raight. base.i.iri- sysc~rn t _r Jeli111iLir1g ertain 
of fisi _;_119 rnonopuJ.y zones eve, if by no ,,,eans cdl of tt1ern , parti ularly 
not those around Cho-Ju-Do I Island, lds ern Sea (..;ea of Japan) and 
Pusan-fushirna grounds . T11ere is an overlapp.ing part of fis ,~ry zones 
arou,,d l.11"' f.,usd11-1sus11ima g uunu...,, ~11.i.c,, , dccording to Arr.icle 1 (J) of 
Agree11tr1~ , s,,uuld l:Ja cJiv.ideu ir,Lo two uy l.i .... stre1.1.911t 1;,,us Juin1r,g t11b 
\1) I LJ R p . Hi1glo Norwagian FisheriGs Case t1951) p . 130 . 
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two end-points of the part with the mid-point of the straight line 
drawn across the areas at their widest points. Just like examples of 
Article 7 of European Fisheries Convention (Mar. 9 1964) and Article 12 
of the 1958 Convention on Territorial Sea, either Korea or Japan should 
not extend its fishery zone beyond the median line. Article 12 of the 
1958 Convention on Territorial Sea provides that where the coasts of two 
States are opposite or adjacent, neither may extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point which is equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of 
each of the two States is measured. (1) 
Indeed the scope of the exclusive area in these areas able to adopt 
a straight baseline system had led to considerable differences of 
opinion between Korea and Japan. From the standpoint of economic and 
political considerations such areas connected by straight baselines are 
the most sensitive region and Japan's superiority in fishing craft used 
to get displayed. Therefore it was very hard to draw the baselines 
unilaterally without previous consultation with each other. However, it 
could not be disregarded by Japan that those fishing areas around the 
islands connecting the straight baselines are vital interests of island 
inhabitants as their economic dependence, even if economic interests do 
not of themselves justify the application of the straight baseline rule 
since the initial determination of whether the formula may be employed 
(1) Article 7 of the European Fisheries Convention; where the coasts of 
two contracting p a rties are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither 
of these Contracting parties is entitled, failing agreement between them 
to the contrary, to establish a fisheries regime beyond the median line, 
every point of which is equidistant from th e nearest points on the low 
water lines of the c oasts of the Contracting parties concerned. 
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continent a l shelf; In the 
absence of agreement between Stat e s concerned, and unless another bound-
ary line is justified by special circumstances the boundary line is the 
median line, in c Pse where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the 
territories of two or mo re States whose co~sts ar e opposite each other. 
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must be founded on geographical considerations. The Article 1 of Korea-
Japan Agreement on Fisheries provides that "each Contracting Party shall 
determine such straight baselines through consultation with the other 
Contracting Party." The phrase, 11 • through consultation with • 
does not, however, indicate that one party shall be subject to another 
in fixing the straight baseline, but rather it has to be construed to 
. 
make settlement of disputes easier and more smooth against possible 
argument concerning the drawing of the straight baselines, because of 
their keen concern over fishing zones. Furthermore, according to judg-
II 
ment of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 11 • although it is true that 
the act of delimitation of sea areas is necessarily a unilateral act 
because only the coastal state is competent to undertake it, the validity 
of the delimitation with regard to other states depends upon inter-
national lAw. The delimitation of sea areas has always an international 
aspect. Therefore it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the 
coast state as expressed in its municipal law." ''The sovereignty of a 
state is limited not only by the rights of other states but also the 
general interests of international society. 11 (1) 
One of the geographical criteria of Article 4(2) in the 1958 
Geneva Sea Conference, namely that the drawing of such baselines must 
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the 
coast, lends itself to considerable subjective judgment in its applica-
tion. Lle have to, therefore, turn to the decision of the International 
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case for guidance. 
On the question of the degree of permissible departure from the general 
direction of the coast, the Court stated that straight baselines, within 
reasonable limits, might depart from the physical line of the coast. (2) 
The criterion of "general direction of the coast" implies a great deal 
of subjective appreciation. Llhen baselines unilaterally drawn even if 
Korean Government is careful in examining the coasts as a whole and not 
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one sector of them only, it is very hard to rule out the idea of sub-
jective judgment by Korea. From the beginning Korea insisted on drawing 
straight baselines connecting the extreme outward tips of the offshore 
islands, while Japan wanted to base the twelve mile limit on the low-
tide line of the coastal peninsula. In other words, thP Republic of 
Korea wanted from 30 to 40 miles as an average from the coastal line of 
the Korean peninsula, while Japan would recognize twelve miles from the 
coast of the peninsula as the exclusive fishery zone. Korea wanted 
wider zones and power to regulate Japanese fishery activities as much as 
possible, whereas Japan was in favour of narrow zones and less stringent 
control. Therefore, as indicated by Bowett , (3) the Agreement on Fish-
eries of June 22, 1965 is a product of compromise. It reflects the 
Korean position in the exclusive fishery zone and the Japanese position 
in the joint regulation zone. The Agreement recognizes that each country 
has the right to establish an exclusive fishery zone with a twelve-mile 
limit (Article 1), provided that when a straight baseline is used to 
establish the zone, the baseline must be determined by mutual agreement. 
Japan agreed to allow the Republic of Korea to establish its exclusive 
zone from four straight baselines (Exchange of Note) connecting the tips 
of the various offshore islands. Except the southern coast of Che-Ju-Do 
Island and Eastern Sea of the Korean peninsula the actual width of the 
exclusive fishery zones, however, ranges from 18 miles to 90 miles in 
the seas of the south and west. Anyway, this Agreement is the first and 
only international agreement under which Japan has consensually recog-
nized the establishm e nt of a twelve-mile fishery zone. 
(1) IC J Reports (1951) ibid, pp 132. 152. 
L M Alexander, "The Law of the Sea" (the Ohio State University Press 1967: 
p. 17 
(2) I CJ Reports (1951) ibid. p. 133. 
(3) See page 24 of this paper, note (2) 
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7. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS 
(1) THE BREADTH OF TERRITORIAL SEA 
The Fisheries Agreement was concluded for the purpose of reasonable 
settlement of the long dispute between Korea and Japan arising from 
fisheries, but there still remain some unsolved problems. 
First of all, the Fisheries Agreement has only established the 
breadth of the exclusive fishery zone as twelve nautical miles, without 
referring to the breadth of the territorial sea of the Republic of Korea. 
The Government of Korea has never made any public expression of its view 
as the breadth of her territorial sea since the day of her independence. 
(1) The only exception to this was the assertion of territorial sov-
ereignty of 20 to 200 nautical miles (measured from the coast) by the 
Presidential Proclamation of 1952. It might be controversial that only 
the baseline of the exclusive fishery zone is agreed upon, while the 
relation between such a baseline and the baseline of the territorial 
sea is not made clear. 
Therefore, in the Fisheries Agreement which lay aside the question 
of the breadth of the territorial sea of the Republic of Korea, the 
legal situation of foreign vessels in the fishing zone of the Republic 
of Korea is still uncertain. Since 1870, Japan has consistently main-
tained the three-mile principle as to the breadth of the territorial sea, 
and has never admitted that any other country may insist upon any wider 
(1) "The Official Note to Overseas Korean Diplomats and Ambassadors" 
(Feb. 1978): The Korean National Assembly on Dec. 16, 1977 enacted the 
law of the breadth of the territorial sea, consisting of eight provis-
ions. The breadth of the territorial sea, according to Article 2, is 
twelve nautical miles and the low-water line will be adopted to measure 
it except that the method of straight baselines is applicable under the 
special geographical conditions. This law became effective from the 
date of its promulgation, April 30, 1978 by the enforcement regulation 
of Presidential Decree No. 8994. 
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zone. In spite of this, not only did Japan recognize a twelve nautical 
miles' exclusive fishery zone of the Republic of Korea, but also estab-
lished her own exclusive fishery zone of the same breadth along her own 
coast where Korean fishing vessels might otherwise come to fish. The 
Government of Japan, however, is of the opinion that the rules concern-
ing the exclusive fishery zone shall apply only to the fishing vessels 
of the Republic of Korea, and that, as a rule, fishing vessels of third 
countries may engage in fishing as ever in the waters outside the three 
miles from Japanese coasts. 
(2) JURISDICTION OVER THE DOKDO ISLA NDS 
Dokdo Islands (1) are composed of two main uninhabited islands and 
thirty-two smaller islets of less than twenty-five acres and is situated 
at 37°14 1 18" north latitude and 131°52 1 33" east longitude. It is 
approximately fifty miles to the southeast of 11 Ullungdo Island" (the 
second largest island of Korea) and eighty-six miles to the northwest 
of "Dkishima" in the Sea of Japan. The title to Dokdo Islands was dis-
puted for the first time when the ROK drew the Rhee Line in such a way 
as to locate these islands within the Rhee Line. The Government of Japan 
lodged a strong protest with the ROK on Jan. 28, 1952 claiming that 
Dokdo was without question Japanese territory. (2) Each government has 
since then att e mpted to justify its claims by stressing original title 
to the islands ba s e d on historical findinqs. On Sept. 25, 1954 the 
Government of Japan proposed submission of this case to the International 
Court of Justice but this proposal was flatly rejected by the ROK on 
( 1) "Dok do Gwangye Zaryojip - Haksul Ronmoon" 
(Cumulative ma terials regarding Dokdo Islands Academic Di s sertation) 
(Vol. II (1977) the Ministry of Korean Foreign Affairs) pp.3.19.145. 
The French name of Dokdo is Boussole Rocks (1787) or Liancourt Rocks 
which was named after the French sailor of the French Whaling Vessel, who 
first saw on the ma st Dokdo in 1849. The Russian name of Dokdo is ~llada 
(1854); English name, Hornet Rocks (1855); Japanese name, Takeshima (1905) 
\2) op cit. p.40 
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Oct. 28, 1954. From the Korean point of view there is not the slightest 
doubt or question about the title of Ookdo, since Ookdo is allegedly 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea. In 
practice the question of title to Dokdo had never been placed on the 
agenda of the overall talks between two countries, although the problem 
had on occasion been discussed. A wide gulf separates the approaches of 
the two countries to this problem, even after the conclusion of the 
normalization treaty in 1965, since the ROK established its 12-mile ex-
clusive fishery zone around Dokdo Islands. The Government of Japan is 
of the view that th e problem should be settled in accordance with the 
Article 9 of the Fisheries Agreement on June 22, 1965 which describes the 
settlement of disputes, in which both governments agree to settle any 
dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of the present 
Agreement primarily through diplomatic channels and when they fail to do 
so, they seek settl e ment by arbitration board in accordance with pro-
cedures to be agreed upon between them. The ROK spurns the Japanese view 
and holds that this Article 9 is quite irrelevant to the Dokdo question. 
Korea declared th a t the normalization treaty and other related agreements 
were signed only because and after the Japanese representatives had 
withdrawn their claim to title to Dokdo. On the contrary Japan has in-
sisted th a t she never agreed to recognize Korean title to Ookdo and the 
problem concerning Ookdo was an issue to be solved in accordance with the 
above-stated Article 9. At present the Islands of Dokdo are actually 
under the physical control of the Republic of Korea. 
While the Korean Government claims Dokdo on the ground that the 
island was discovered (AD 512) and has been effectively administered by 
the Korean authority, (1) the Japanese Government alleges that the Island 
was an unappropriated territory (terra nullius) when Japan incorporated 
(1) Ookdo Gwangye Zaryojip, op cit. pp 14.26.32.39.146-47.246. 
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it into "Shimane Prefecture" in 1905. (1) Since the conquest (AD 512) 
of the 11 Ullungdo 11 Island (Dagelet) to the southeast of which the Dokdo 
Island is located fifty miles aw a y, Korean occupation over Dokdo was 
legally strengthened by the governmental expedition in 1476. Because of 
an intimate geographical rel a tion with Ullungdo, Dokdo was at a certain 
time treated as pa rt of Ullungdo and both isl a nds had th e same name. The 
Korean Government, sending inspection groups every two years, had admin-
istered the Dokdo Isl a nds as a part of Korean territory during the period 
of 1476-1905 by way of continuous, peaceful and effective display of 
state authority without being contested or challenged by any other nation. 
(2) This proves that Korean Government turned its inchoate titles of 
( 1 ) Op cit. pp 47. 132. 223. 240. 276. 
(2) D H Harris, op cit. pp 176-19 2 . J L Brierly, op cit. pp. 168-170 
Charles Hyde, 11 Internc1tional Law" (2nd ed. rev. Boston 1951) p. 339. 
L Preuss, "The Dis pute between Denmark and Norway over the Sovereignty of 
East Greenland" 26 AJIL (1932) pp. 469-487. 
Dokdo Gwangye Zaryojip, op cit. pp. 108-116. 
of Nations" (2nd ed. New York, 1952) p. 241. 
Palmas (Miangas) Arbitration (US- Netherlands 
Herbert lJ Briggs, "The Law 
In the case of the Island 
(1928), continuous and peace-
ful display of the functions of state within a given region is a con-
stituent element of territorial sovereignty. 
lJhiteman, "Digest of International Law" Vol II (1963) pp. 1030-1037. 
Effective control is an element of title which is of central importance for 
the purpose of both the acquisition and maintenance of title. lJhat 
amounts to effective occupation varies from place to place. In case of 
islets and rooks or jungle country, limits are set to physical appro-
priation (Minguiers and Ecrehos Case ICJ Rep. (1953) p. 53). In that of a 
relinquished and uninhabited island, as Clipperton Island, an initial dis-
play of sovereignty may suffice even to maint a in the title unless evidence 
of any subsequently expressed intention to abandon such jurisdiction is 
forthcoming (Briggs ibid. Clipperton Island Arbitration (France-Mexico 
1931) pp. 249-250). It is neither feasible nor necessary that the state 
jurisdiction should be exercised at every moment in every pa rt of the 
territory in question. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible 
with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according to whether 
inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved (Briggs, ibid. p. 241). 
In the Island of Pe lmas, Eastern Greenl a nd and Clipperton cases, the 
leading authorities on effective occupation lay down that the exercise or 
display of sovereignty must be (a) peaceful (b) actual (c) sufficient to 
confer a valid title to sovereignty, and (d) continuous. In the case 
concerning the legal status of Eastern Greenland, instead of using the 
terms "effective possession", two requisites were shown for the creation 
of a right of sovereignty to be derived from "continued display of 
authority," viz. "the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some 
actual exercise or display of such authority." 
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discovery into a real title of occupation. In addition, the intermittance 
and discontinuity (which Japan has very often insisted on) comparable with 
the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according to whether 
inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved. Anyway, the taking of 
possession of Dokdo by Korea can by no means be in the nature of a mere 
symbolic act. 
After the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War (1904) Japan forcibly con-
eluded the Japanese-Korean protocol with Korea in 1904. By this treaty 
Korea was deprived of partial right of diplomacy, and moreover, the 
territorial integrity of Korea became vulnerable by Article 4 of the 
protocol (1) which allowed the Japanese Government to occupy and utilize 
the strategic areas deemed necessary for military purposes. Japan further 
attained to sBtisfy her ambition with the conclusion of the second 
Japanese-Korean Agreement (so-called Protective Treaty) on Nov. 17, 1905, 
(2) in which Korea surrendered all the rights of diplomacy to Japan and 
was no longer an actual self-governed nation. After liberation in 1945 
the Korean Government, restoring its sovereignty, has effectively ad-
ministered Dokdo Islands since 1947 and the re-restablishment of Korean 
sovereignty does not violate any international treaty and agreement. In 
addition, the police force are dispatched by the Korean Government not 
only to protect its sovereign rights over Dokdo, but also to maintain the 
safety of Korean nationals engaging in fishing around the Islands. A 
lighthouse was built on the Island by the Korean Government in 1954 in 
order to contribute to international sailing. Therefore, Korea has never 
lost right of Ookdo by derelicto, since she never had the animus of 
abandoning the Islands (3) just except the period of Japanese colonization 
by forcible treaty. In as much as Japan, disclaiming her imperialistic 
(1) (2) Ookdo Gwangye Zaryojip, op cit. pp. 75. 55. 
Korea; Treaties and Agreements (Wa shington 1921) (Pamphlet series of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace No 43) PP• 36.55. 
(3) H Briggs, ibid. p. 249. D H Harris, ibid. p. 188. 
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ambition in accordance with the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam Declaration 
(1945) (1), renounced all the claims to Korea in the 1951 Peace Treaty 
(Art. 2), these treaties (the 1904 Protocol and the 1905 Protective 
Treaty) undoubtedly representing the Korea invasion of Japanese imperial-
ism should be considered as null and void. The Sam-il Independence 
Movement of March 1, 1919 against Japanese colonization was particularly 
renowned as the event of the representing the general will of the Korean 
people against the Japanese imperialism to the whole world. There is also 
a self-evident provision in "Treaty on Basic Relations" concluded between 
two countries in 1965, Article 2 of which stipul a tes that "It is confirmed 
th a t all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and 
the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and 
void." In this regard, it is to be definite that the Korean Government 
has the right to denounce such treaties as illegal and invalid. The 
Korean Government restored her administration of animus occupandi and 
corpus occupandi over Dokdo as soon as the Isl a nds taken out of Japanese 
administration by SCAP Directives No. 677 and 1033, by which (especially 
Directive 677(3)) Japan is defined to include the four main islands of 
Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approxim a tely 1,000 
smaller adjacent isl ?nds, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu 
(Nansei ) Island s north of 30° north latitude; and excluding Ullung Island, 
Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo or Takeshima Islands) and Quelpart (Chejudo) Island. 
These Directives were r e affirmed by the decision of Far Eastern Commission 
of July 11, 1947. (1) The MacArthur Line was a lso drawn in Oct 3, 1945 
beyond 12 mil e s east of Dokdo. The Korean Government, planting the land-
mark, immediately restored her administr a tion of Dokdo under Ullung Goon 
(Ullung County) in Aug. 1947. Furthermore, the Korean Government 
(1) Dokdo Gwangye Zaryojip, op cit. pp. 81-83. 479. 484. 
Llhiteman, op cit. (Val III, 1964) pp. 496-499. 
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positively launched plans for the historical and geographical research 
of Dokdo, sending expedition groups in Aug. 1948, Sept. 1952, and Dec. 
1953, which greatly contributed to the evaluation of Ookdo. Korea also 
made strong protest against the mistaken bombardments of the US Air Force 
in 1950 and 1952, by exercising her sovereignty over Dokdo. Section (a) 
of Article 2 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty raised the question 
concerning the legality of the Korean occupation of Dokdo. Article 2 
provides as follows: "Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, 
renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of 
Quelpart (Chejudo), Port Hamilton (Gomundo) and Dagelet (Ullungda)." 
A great deal of attention should be given to the interpretation of this 
section in considering whether Dokdo was taken outside of Korean territory 
or was restored under the Japanese authority on account of the Peace 
Treaty. The Republic of Korea was established under the auspices of the 
UN in Dec. 1948 (UN Resolutions 195 (III)) (1) and her sovereignty was 
restored over thP entire territory which was appropriated by the invasive 
act of the Japanese Imperial Government. In the Cairo Declaration of 
1943, the three Great Powers (US, UK, China), assuring Korean sovereignty, 
assertively determined that 11 Japan will also be expelled from all other 
territories which she has taken by violence and greed, 11 and "mindful of 
the enslavement of the people of Korea, that in due course Korea shall 
become free and independent. 11 (2) The Korean Goverr.rrer·t , uecoming in-
dependent, restored her soveignty over Dokdo, and h8s maintained her 
territorial rights o\1er the Islands in accordance with the aim of the 
(1) Article 3 of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and 
Japan stipulates that 11 It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic 
of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as soecified in the Resol-
ution 195 (III) of the UN General Assembly." 
See also, Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, 
part I Resolutions (A/810) p. 25. 
(2) Llhiteman, op cit. (Vol. III) pp. 478-479. 511-512. 601. 
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Cairo Declaration. Then, it must be construed that the enumeration of 
the three main big islands in Section (a), Article 2 of the Peace Treaty 
with Japan does not rule out Dokdo from the boundary of Korean territory. 
In as much as the enumeration of all small islands in the provision of 
the Treaty is actually impossible, especially in the case of uninhabited 
islands like Dokdo, the mention of Dagelet in the Treaty of Peace may 
be assumed as including Dokdo which has been regarded as an attached 
island of Dagelet. It should be concluded that the Treaty of Peace with 
Japan does not hamper or illegalize the legitimate possession of Dokdo 
by the Korean Government . 
8. KOREAN POSITION AT THE THIRD 
UN CONFERENCE ON THE LALl OF SEA 
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At the third UN Conference on the Law of Sea (Second Session; 
Caracas 20 June - 29 August, 1974) Korean delegation clarified the 
position of the Republic of Korea in regard to some key issues of the 
law of sea with which Korea is vitally concerned. 
(1) TERRITORIAL SEA AND INNOCENT PASSAGE (1) 
Because of its geographical location and special security concerns 
the ROK had some particular problems with regard to the territorial sea 
and the right of innocent passage. It was one of the few countries which 
had not yet declared the breadth of its territorial sea. (2) The Korean 
representative, Mr Roe at Cara ca s Conference, however, reaffirmed his 
country's support for a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles, measured from 
appropriate baselines in accordance with the provisions of the 1958 
Geneva Convention. (3) Japan also supported the first two Articles of 
the text proposed by the United Kingdom with regard to the delimitation of 
the territorial sea. (4) As far as the innocent passage is concerned, 
(1) Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea; Official Record (United 
Nations, New York 1975) Vol III pp. 101-102. 109-110. 119. 
Korean Journal of International Law (KJIL) "General statement by Ambassador 
SONG at Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea" Vol.19 (No.1) June 1974 p. 85. 
(2) See footnote (1) page 44 of this paper. 
(3) Sayre A Swarztrauber, op cit. pp. 180.182. Korean representative, Mr 
Lee at the 1958 Geneva Conference also stated that the 3-mile limit was 
inadequate to meet Korea's economic need. 
(4) A/CONF 62/C 2/L 3. Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea (1975) op 
cit. p. 183. 
( A r t i cl e 1 : ( 1 ) T h e so v e r e i g n t y o f a s ta t e e x t en d s b e yo n d i t s l and t e r r i tory 
and its internal waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast described 
as the territorial sea. (2) The sovereignty of a coastal state extends 
also to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to the bed and 
and subsoil thereof. (3) The coastal state exercises this sovereignty 
subject to the provisions of this Convention and other rules of inter-
national law) (Article 2 : The territorial sea may not extend beyond 12 
nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of territorial sea 
is measured (note: add here thetext of Articles 3 to 13 of the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea a,,d Contiguous Zone) 
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however, Korean delegation was far from satisfied at the UK proposals, 
even if it was thought to be a good basis for consideration of the 
question of the passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea. 
First, paragraph 2 of Article 16 (1) should have stated positively that 
the passage of a foreign ship should be considered not innocent if such 
and such acts were committed, instead of the negative formulation used. 
Furthermore, in enumerating the acts which were not innocent, the article 
omitted some important acts which were of major concern to control of 
coastal states: acts such as espionage, the collecting of information or 
propaganda against the coastal state, or any other warlike or hostile 
act or acts which did not have a direct bearing on the passage. Secondly, 
in its Article 26 (2) the passage of warships through a territorial sea 
which does not constitute a necessary and important route for inter-
national navigation should be differentiated from the passage of other 
types of vessel. A coastal state should have the right to require 
foreign warships passing through its territorial sea to give prior notifi-
cation of that passage or to obtain prior authorization for it. 
(1) A/CONF 62/C 2/L.3. Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea. p. 104. 
(Article 16) paragraph 2: passage of a foreign ship shall not be consid-
ered prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state 
unless, in the territorial sea, it engages in any threat or use of force 
in violation of the Charter of the UN against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of the coastal state, or without authorization 
from the coastal state or justification under international law in any 
of the following activities: 
(a) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind. 
(b) the launching or taking on board of any aircraft. 
(c) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device. 
(d) the embarking or disembarking of any person or cargo contrary to the 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws or regulations of the 
coastal state. 
(e) any act aimed at interfering with any system of communication of the 
coastal state. 
(f) any act aimed at interfering with other facilities or installations 
of the coastal state. 
(2) ibid P• 185. 
nw 08R{RT 
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(2) CONTINENTAL SHELF (1) 
The Republic of Korea firmly believed in the ipso facto and ab 
initio rights of coastal states over the submerged natural prolongation 
of their land territory known as the continental shelf (Article 1 of 
Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas, Jan. 
1952). Any infringement of the sovereign rights that a country legit-
imately exercises over the resources of its adjacent continental shelf 
is unacceptable. With respect to the outer limit of the continental shelf 
Korean delegation recognized the need to revise the "exploitability 
criterion" incorporated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf (Article 1). (2) Therefore, the 200-mile "distance criterion" 
should apply in the first place and when the natural prolongation of the 
continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles, the continental margin should 
be the limit of national jurisdiction. 
Japanese delegation (Mr Ogiso) took the view that the "criterion 
of distance" seemed to be preferable, primarily because it was more 
simple, clear and equitable than other criteria based on depth, geomor-
phology or topography. It would be wrong to perpetuate the inequity of 
nature that would entitle some states to continental shelf or coastal 
sea-bed areas extending only a few miles from the coast while entitling 
others to such areas extending for several hundred miles, especially to 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea op cit. pp. 147-48. 
Korea Journal of Internation a l Law, ibid. pp. 87-88 . 
The exploitability test as provided in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
tinental Shelf Convention has proved to be the starting point for almost 
unlimited outward expansion of exclusive continental shelf and for the 
virtual elimination of the concept nf the continental shelf as a legally 
meaningful definition. It will cause the entire ocean-beds eventually to 
be divided up among coastal states in total disregard of the concept of 
the common heritage. Such a fragmentation of the ocean-beds would 
nullify the "Declaration of principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean 
floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." It is therefore 
crucially important to seek general consensus among the nations of the 
world regarding the point where the national jurisdiction ends and where 
the area of the common heritage of mankind starts . 
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the detriment of the fishing industry of the developing countries. 
Japanese delegation believed that the coastal state should have the right 
to establish beyond its 12-mile territorial sea a coastal sea-bed area 
up to a maximum distance of (not exceeding) 200 nautical miles, in which 
it exercised sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing 11 non-living resources". ( 1 ) In enclosed and semi-enclosed areas 
such as the one surrounding the Korean peninsula, the claims of adjacent 
and opposite states are bound to overlap. In such cases, Korean dele-
gation insisted that delimitation of the boundary should be settled by 
agreement betwen the parties concerned. In the absence of any specific 
agreement or of any special circumstances, the principle of the median 
line of equidistance should apply. If the parties concerned could not 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement or if one party had difficulty 
in accepting the claim of the other in the area where jurisdiction or 
claims overlapped, joint development schemes should be taken into consider· 
ation, as had been suggested by the ICJ in its 1969 decision on the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Case. ( 2 ) Japan simply suggested that the boundary 
between adjacent or opposite states should be determined by agreement 
(1) Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea, ibid p. 147: Japan had drawn 
a distinction between the legal regime to be applied to the non-living 
resources of the sea-bed and the sub-soil, and that to be applied to the 
living resources. 
S Oda, "International Law of the Resources of the Sea" Recueil des cours 
(1969, tome 127 (II)) pp. 425-430. At the Geneva Conference there was a 
serious error made in connection with the Continental Shelf Convention 
provision on the definition of continental shelf resources. The sedentary 
fisheries pertain to the high se8s rather than to the sea-bed and should 
be expressly excluded from the category of continental shelf resources. 
The regime of the high seas relating to fishing, especially the Geneva 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas should be made applicable to sedentary fisheries and the fishing of 
king crab in particular. There is no reason for these living resources to 
be treated differently from ordinary fishery resources and handled in the 
same way as petroleum or natural gas on the sole ground that these living 
resources crawl on the sea -bed and do not swim in the sea. 
(2) ICJ Reports, "North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969) p. 52. This 
solution appears particularly appropriate when it is a question of pre-
serving the unity of deposit. 
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in accordance with the principle of equidistance, which, according to 
the ICJ decision, is "part of the corpus of general international law 
and an inescapable a priori accompaniment of basic continental shelf 
doctrine". (1) 
(3) EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZO~E (2) 
Korean delegation supported the concept of the 200-mile economic 
zone or patrimonial sea in the belief that the interests of the coastal 
states, particularly the developing ones, in the natural resources of the 
area adjacent to their territorial seas should be respected, and that 
the existing international regime concerning the conservation and util-
ization or living resources was largely inadequate. The rights and com-
petence of coastal states, such as the exclusive right over renewable 
living resources, sovereign rights over non-renewable mineral resources, 
specific rights to control marine pollution and scientific research 
were generally acceptable to Korean delegation. In this connection 
special care should be taken to guarantee freedom of navigation and 
overflight as well as that of layinq submarine cables and pipelines. 
As to the mineral resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, Korean delegation 
was prepared to support, as the outer limit of national jurisdiction, 
a ''distance criterion" of 200 miles in the first place and also the 
outer edge of the continental margin when the submerged natural prolong-
ation of the land mass extended over 200 miles. That concept of the 
continental shelf was in the view of Korean delegation, not at all in-
compatible with the concept of a 200-mile economic zone. 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
218. 
On the contrary, for Japan, the sea areas beyond the territorial 
ICJ Reports (1969) ibid. pp. 28-29.32. 
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, ibid. pp. 196. 215. 217-
Korea Journal of International Law (1974) ibid. p. 87-90. 
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sea should retain basically the character of high seas without inter-
fering with the freedom of fishing for traditional fishing states within 
the two hundred mile economic zone. This is the only crucial and out-
standing difference of opinions between Korea and Japan at the third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The confrontation between two 
countries still existed over the high seas fishing since the 1958 
Geneva Conference. Japan believed that it was surely not appropriate 
to abolish freedom of fishing in the high seas only because of the risk 
of abuse, and that it was an exaggeration to contend that the danger of 
depletion of world fishery resources was imminent or omnipresent. Free-
dom of access to fishery resources, if it was retained only beyond 200 
miles, would become practically meaningless. If the proposed 200 mile 
economic zone was adopted, the major fertile fishing grounds of the 
world would come under the exclusive jurisdiction of several coastal 
states, including some highly developed countries. This fact showed that 
acceptance of the exclusive 200-mile economic zone as currently conceived 
would accentuate rather than reduce existing inequities. Therefore, 
Japan insisted that the solution reached at the Conference must provide 
for protection and due respect for traditional fishing rights. It should 
also take into account conclusions reached by the ICJ in the two Fish-
eries Jurisdiction Cases, which had held that both a coastal state and 
a non-coastal state had rights in the fishing resources of the north-east 
Atlantic because of the special dependence of their peoples on fishing.(1) 
(4) STARTLING PROGRESS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY 
The Republic of Korea, with a territory of approximately 100,000 
squ?re kilometers and a population of over 34 million, had many problems: 
(1) ICJ Reports "Fisheries Jurisdiction Case" (UK v. Iceland) 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) (1974) pp. 31-32 . 
- 58 -
its natural resources are limited, and it has suffered from a consequent 
lack of capital. Nevertheless, it has managed to develop its economy, 
an important aspect of which is the fishing industry. Over 1.5 million 
people in the Republic of Korea depend upon fishing for their livelihood. 
The RDK is now one of the major pelagic fishing nations, with over 800 
fishing vessels engaged in ocean fishing all over the world. That is 
the reason why Korean delegation was particularly concerned with the 
utilization of the living resources of the sea. Fish are tangible assets 
capable of exploitation for the nourishment of human beings and for 
profitable sale to others. The total production of fisheries industry 
increased from 470,000 tons in 1962 to 2,421,273 tons in 1976 which was 
an increase of 5.3 times and the total tonnage of fishing vessels in-
creased from 162,000 tons in 1962 to 661,000 tons in 1976, an increase 
of 4 times during the period of 14 years. Thus, Korea has become one 
of the top ten fishing nations of the world. ( 1 ) In developinq that 
industry, the country has endured tremendous hardships and sacrifices, 
including loss of human life. The future of Korean fishermen largely 
will depend upon the result of the decision taken at the Conference. 
Therefore, Korean delegation would be most happy if the regime of ex-
clusive jurisdiction of a coastal zone over the living resources of the 
economic zone could allow the fishermen of developing countries to have 
access to the part of those resources not fully exploited by the fisher-
men of the coastal state. Korean delegation earnestly hoped that general 
agreement could be reached on the principle that, in order to guarantee 
the maximum utilization of the living resources of the sea, coastal 
states should allow such access on a non-discriminatory basis and under 
reasonable conditions. 
(1) "Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics" (Dong Yang Cultural printing 
company, Seoul Korea) (1977). 
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(5) RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE RHEE LINE 
In relation to the allegation by Korean delegation in the Third 
UN Conference on the Law of Sea, the Rhee Line evokes quite an intriguing 
aspect of re-examination. In a sense, the "Korean Presidential Pro-
clamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas" (1952 by President 
Syngman Rhee) is proper for the occasion in the light of the present 
main trends of the law of sea. It can't be over-estimated, even if it 
is said that President Syngman Rhee, had foresight on the next future 
law of the world ocean. In fact there is a substantial identity with 
insignificant differences between Rhee Line and the 200 mile economic 
zone proposed in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Over 
100 countries spoke in support of an economic zone extending to a limit 
of 200 nautical miles as part of an overall treaty settlement. There 
was also widespread support for the content of the economic zone in-
cluding coastal state sovereign or exclusive rights for the purpose of 
exploitation and exploration of living and non-living resources. It is 
clear that the economic zone is not a territorial sea. However, some 
classic high seas freedom (e.g. fishing) will be eliminated or modified. 
Subject to the provisions on pollution, other freedoms will be retained 
(for instance, navigation and overflight as well as rights to lay and 
maintain submarine cables and pipelines). (1) Both Rhee Proclamation 
and proposals on the exclusive economic zone admit that a coastal state 
has sovereign rights to manage, prospect, exploit and preserve the living 
and mineral resources of the sea and sea-bed. Such rights would in-
disputably give a coastal state big economic advantages and would at the 
(1) John R Stevenson and Bernard H Oxman, "The Third UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea". The 1974 Caracas Session, AJIL (Vol. 69 1975) 
pp. 15-18. 
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same time, create a new situation on the high seas which account for 
more than one-third of the surface of the world ocean. The Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea places emphasis that in exercising its 
rights and obligations in tne economic zone a coastal state shall have 
due regard to the rights and duties of other states, and that all states,· 
whether coastal or land-locked, shall enjoy in the economic zone the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, and other international lawful uses of the sea 
related to navigation and communications. From these propositions it 
follows that the economic zone, provided that sovereign rights of a 
coastal state to the resources of the zone, remains a part of the high 
seas, where all states enjoy freedom of navigation and other activity 
not concerned with the zone's resources. This main theme at the Third 
UN Conference is almost identical with the promulgation of the Rhee 
Line in 1952, Article 4 of which stipulates that "this declaration of 
sovereignty over the adjacent seas does not interfere with the rights 
of free navigation on the high seas. 11 By inserting the words "high seas" 
in its Article 4, the Rhee Line did not alter the legal regime of the 
h i g h s ea s bey o n d t h e t e r r i to r i a 1 w a t e r s • Furthermore, Article 2 of 
Korean Fishery Resources Conservation Law (1954), which was declared to 
assure sufficient protection of marine fauna against abusive exploitation 
and extermination by Japan, did not exclude the right of foreign fishing 
within the zone of the Rhee Line on the condition that any person who 
wanted to engage in fishing in the jurisdictional waters of the Rhee 
Line should obtain permission from the competent Minister. 
All the states in the 1950 1 s thought the Presidential Proclamations 
of some Latin American countries ridiculous and the Presidential Proclam-
ation of Korea as well. However, time has changed this. Nevertheless 
Japan still insists that the traditional fishing rights, say, freedom 
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of fishing in the 200-mile economic zone should be respected, which 
they think would accentuate equities. 
Apart from Article 10 of the ROK-Japan Fisheries Agreement stating 
that "The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five 
years and thereafter until one year from the day on which either Contract-
ing Party shall give notice to the other of its intentions to terminate 
the present Agreement," there is some room for reconsideration of this 
Aqreement in view of the general tendency of the Third UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, especially in order to prevent the ROK- Japan Agree-
ment on Fisheries from being reduced to a mere scrap of paper. (1) 
The reason for this is that the joint control zone and the joint fishery 
resources survey zone would be covered by the 200-mile economic zone 
and the continental shelf areas by the distance criterion. ( 2) In 
addition, the declaration of the breadth of the 12-mile territorial sea 
entering into force April 30, 1978 now overlaps the exclusive 12-mile 
fishery zone as well as the contiguous zone. (3) Nevertheless, is it 
rightful to say that the 12-mile fishery zone agreed upon by both 
countries in 1965 exists only in virtue of the 1965 Fisheries Agreement? 
We have to bear it firmly in mind that the Korean national sovereignty 
(1) Choon-ho Park, "Fisheries Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East 
China Sea" (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, 
occasional paper - · 18, 1973) p. 12. In Dec. 1970 when the five-year 
mandatory period of the fishery treaty was to have expired, neither side 
chose to exercise its right to give the one-year notice of abrogation. 
Nor has either indicated any intention to do so since. 
(2) Choon-ho Park, ibid. The provisional character of the various 
stipulations of the ROK-Japan Agreement receives less emphasis with the 
passage of time. The fishery issue will continue to remain subordinate 
to larger issues by which it was overridden in 1965. 
(3) Choon-ho Park, ibid. In arlopting a 12-mile territorial sea Korea 
should give careful consideration to the problem of straight baselines 
in light of the fact that the fishery treaty with Japan has specified 
four straiqht baselines from which the 12-mile fishery zone of Korea was 
measured. Unless the new ones for the territorial sea of Korea happened 
to coincide with those agreed upon with Japan for the purpose of the 
fishery treaty, their legal status in relation to the existing arrange-
ments will give rise to some controversy. 
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is being exercised in this twelve - mile territorial sea , in other 
words , in the twelve - mile fishery zone established in 1965 between 
Korea and Japan . (1) 
As stated by President Nixon on the US Ocean Policy (May , 1970) 
t he present law of the sea is inadequate to meet the conce r ns of the 
international community anrl the needs of modern technology . Unless 
it is modernized multilaterally , unilateral action and international 
conflict are inevitable . (2) 
( 1) Llhen Korea exercises "dominium" or jurisdiction in its territorial 
sea , it is exercising powers conferred upon it by its own law in an 
area which international law regards as belonging to it . In the 
territorial sea no specific international law warranty is needed for 
the general exercise of jurisdiction , the right to which automatically 
follows from dominium . Thus , international law operates as a restrain -
ing rather than as an enRbling force . On the high seas including the 
c ~ntiguous zone the restriction i s alwa ys and automatically there , 
except in so far as international law may relax it . 
The enforcement of exclusive fishing riqhts in the twelve - mile monopoly 
zone is of its nature , tantamount to an exercise of 11 dominium 11 only 
with respect to the fish and other marine products present in this zone 
and only in r elation to Japanese fishing vessels . At any rate , once 
the breadth of the Korean territorial sea is promulgated as twelve miles , 
the contiguous zone and the 12 - mile exclusive fishery zone will be 
swallowed up altogether and cease to exist . 
Choon - ho Park , ibid . Deci s ion on the extent of the territorial sea 
will bring ab out the "honourable retirement" of the Peace Line . 
( 2 ) L e w i s r~ A 1 e x a n d e r ( e d ) , 11 T h e L a w o f t h e S e a 11 ( P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e 
Sixth Annual Conferenc e of the Law of the Sea Institute , University 
of Rhode Isl a nd , 1972) p . 1 . 
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9. CONCLUSION 
The conditions under which "Resolution Six on the Special Situ-
ation Relating to Coastal Fisheries" (1) recommends collaboration be-
tween coastal and non-coastal states in reaching agreements, which 
recognize the "priority requirements'' of the former, unquestionably 
exist in Korea. Fishing is an important part of her economy and fish 
is the chief source of animal protein in the diet of her people. Nor 
is it open to debate th a t the Japanese fishing fleet, equipment and 
methods are far superior to those of the Koreans, who had employed hand 
fishing, factors of which the Japanese are aware and which they are 
prepared to alleviate by helping Korea with the modernization of her 
fishing vessels and with other technical assistance. 
Yet Japan's reluctance to accept extensive controls and he r sub-
mission of counterproposals which give small consideration to the special 
status of the coastal state, can not be brushed aside lightly. The 
Korean-Japanese Fisheries Agreement and the supplementary arrangements 
show that Japan has made major concession to regain Korea's confidenc ~ . 
This view is reinforced by the fact that Tokyo has agreed to grant 
Seoul a fishery cooperation loan of ninety-million dollars repayable 
within eight years, after a grace period of twenty-four months, at a 
low interest rate and has consented to furnish a second loan of thirty 
million dollars for the purchase of Japanese fishing vessels. (2) 
Llaiver of claims for Japanese fishing craft and crewmen captured within 
the Rhee Line, for which she had at one stage of the negotiations sought 
an indemnity of twenty million dollars, (3) lend it further support 
(1) UN Doc. A/CONF B/L 56 VI (1958). Yearbook of the United Nations 
(1958) p. 381. 
(2) Exchange of Notes on Commercial Credits attached to the Agreement on 
the Settlement of Problems concerning property Claims and Economic Co-
operation. See also Korea Times, March 25, 1965. p. 1 col. 8. 
(3) Korea Times, March 19, 1965. p. 1 col. 4; ibid March 30, 1965, p.1. 
col. 7. 
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while Korea has retreated from her previous stand and has yielded to a 
considerable degree in relation to the Rhee Line, Japan has acknowledged 
her neighbour. The settlement is in accord with Resolution Six on the 
Speci~l Situation Relating to Coastal Fisheries of the 1958 Geneva Con-
ference and in the spirit, and in certain respects the methods, of the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zo ne, 
and the Convention on the High Seas. (1) As the fishing monopoly zone 
shows, the Agreement has also taken account of the developments which 
have occurred since the drafting of the Conventions. To a certain extent 
the Korea-Japan Agreement has gone even further. The Geneva Conventions 
do not provide for a fishing zone contiguous to the territorial sea, 
nor does the Fi s hing and Conservation Convention recognize preferential 
fishing rights or directly apportion the use of the fi s hery resources. 
To be sure, the movements which followed the Geneva Conferences delimited 
fishinq grounds independent of the territorial waters. But they sought 
no other rights. The Korea-Japan Agreement on Fisheries, however, corn-
bine these methods o It provides for an exclusive fishing zone and for 
preferential fishing rights outside of this zone. Even though the 
objective of the conservation measures of the Agreement is desig ned to 
achieve a maximum sustained productivity of the marine animal resources 
some time in the future, which is a standard goal of conservation 
agreements, (2) its immediate and direct result is to allocate the use 
of the fisheries in the restricted waters. The Agreement also exemplifies 
(1) For example, Article 1(2), 2, 5(1), 6(3) and 9 of the Fishing and 
Conservation Convention. Article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiquous Zone. Article 2 and 6 of the Convention on the 
High Seas. 
(2) See for example, the preambles to the Convention for the High Seas 
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, (4 UST 380), and the Convention 
for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean (53 AJIL (1959) 
pp. 763-768), and Article 1(2) and 2 of the Fishery and Conservation 
Convention. 
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and contributes to the progressive development or reform of the inter-
national law of the sea and the law of fisheries (especially exclusive 
12-mile fishery zone). 
The Agreement concluded after numerous abortive attempts, shows 
from an overall framework the validity of the international legal system. 
On the occasion of "International Cooperation Year of 1965 11 designated 
by the GenenalAssembly of the United Nations in commemoration of the 
twentieth anniversary of the organization, (1) it was quite worthwhile 
for states engaged in fishery controversies to heed the example set by 
the two Asian neighbours, who were able to resolve differences no less 
important to them than the most vital issue may be to any other state. 
(1) Yearbook of the United Nations (1965) pp. 86-87 ibid. (1963) 
pp. 115-118 (text of Resolution (17) 1907). 
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Desiring that the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery 
resources in waters of mutual interest be maintained; 
Firmly believing that the conservation of such resources and their 
rational exploitation and development will serve the interests of both 
countries; 
Confirming that the principle of freedom at' the high seas shall be 
respected unless otherwise prescribed by special provisions in the 
present Agreement; 
Recognizing the desirability of eliminating the causes of disputes 
which may arise from their geographical proximity and the intermingling 
of their respective fisheries; and 
Desiring mutual cooperation for the development of their fisheries, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
1. The High Contracting Parties mutually recognize that each High 
Contracting Party has the right to establish a sea zone (hereinafter 
"fishery zone") extending not more than 12 nautical miles from its res-
pective coastal base line, over which it will have exclusive jurisdiction 
with respect to fisheries. However, in case either High Contracting 
*(TranslRted for International Legal Materials by Dr Sung Yoon Cho, Legal 
Specialist, Far Eastern Law Division, Library of Congress. As of October 
1, 1965, ratifications had not yet been exchanged. The Treaty on Basic 
Relations between Japan and Korea, signed June 22, 1965, appears at 4 
International Legal Materials 924 (1965).) 
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Party uses the straight base line for the establishment of its fishery 
zone, the straight base line shall be determined through consultation 
with the other High Contracting Party. 
2. The High Contracting Parties shall not present objections when one 
Party excludes the fishing vessels of the other Party from engaging in 
fishing operations in its fishery zone. 
3. Areas where the fishery zones of the High Contracting Parties over-
lap shall be divided in two by straight lines joining the ends of the 
overlapping areas with the midpoints of straight lines drawn across the 
areas at their widest points. 
Article II 
1. The High Contracting Parties shnll establish a joint control zone 
encircled by the lines described below (excluding territorial waters and 
the Republic of Korea's fishery zone). 
(a) A line north on the 124th E meridian north of 37°30 1 N. 
(b) Thence, a line joining the following coordinates in order: 
( I) 
( I I ) 
(II I) 
( I V ) 
( V ) 
(VI) 
(VII) 
(VIII) 
( I X ) 
( X ) 
( X I) 
Article III 
37°30 1 N, 124° E 
36°45 1 N, 124°30 1 E 
33°30' N, 124°30' E 
32°30 1 N, 126° E 
32°30 1 N, 127° E 
34°34 1 30" N, 129°2 1 50 11 E 
34°44 1 10 11 1\1, 129°8 1 E 
34°50 1 N, 129°14 1 E 
35°30 1 N, 130° E 
37°30 1 N, 131°10 1 E 
High peak of Uamnyong 
Until conservation measures necessary for maintaining the maximum 
sustained productivity of fishery resources are implemented on the basis 
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of exhaustive scientific research, the provisional fishery control 
measures listed in the Annex, which forms an integral part of this Agree-
ment, shall be enforced in the joint control zones with respect to 
dragnet fishing and surrounding net fishing, and mackerel fishing by 
fishing vessels of not less than 60 tons. (Ton represents gross ton. 
The tonnage shall be indicated by deducting the tonnage permitted for 
improving living quarters on the vessels.) 
Article IV 
1. The right of control (including the right to halt and inspect 
vessels) and jurisdiction in waters outside the exclusive fishery zone 
shall be exercised only by the High Contracting Party to which the ship 
belongs. 
2. The High Contracting Parties shall exercise appropriate quidance 
and supervision in order to guarantee the faithful observance of the 
provisional fishery control measures by their own nationals and fishing 
vessels, and shall carry out domestic measures, including appropriate 
penalties against violations thereof. 
Article V 
Joint resources survey zones shall be established outside of the 
joint control zones. The scope of the said zones and the surveys to be 
conducted within these zones shall be determined through consultdtion 
between the two High Contracting Parties, on the basis of recommendations 
made by the Joint Fisheries Commission provided for in Article VI. 
Article VI 
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1. The High Contracting Parties shall establish and maintain the 
Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Commission") in order to realize the purposes of this Agree-
ment. 
2. The Commission shall be composed of two national sections, each 
consisting of three members appointed by the Governments of the res-
pective High Contracting Parties . 
3. All resolutions, recommendations, and other decisions of the 
Commission shall be made with the concurrence of the national sections. 
4. The Commission may decide upon and revise, as occasion may require, 
rules for the conduct of its meetings. 
5. The Commission shall meet at least once each year and, in addition, 
it may meet as requested by one of the national sections. The date and 
place of the first meeting shall be determined by agreement between the 
Hiqh Contracting Parties. 
6. At its first meeting, the Commission shall select a Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman, one from each national section. The Chairman and Vice-
Chairman shall hold office for a period of one year. During the succeed-
ing years selection of a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from the national 
sections shall be made in such a manner as will provide each High Con-
tracting Party in turn with representation in those offices. 
7. A standing secretariat shall be established undPr the Commission to 
carry out the businPss of the Commission. 
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8. The official languages of the Commission shall be Japanese and 
Korean. Proposals and data may be presented in either official language, 
or, if necessary, they may be presented in English. 
9. In the event that the Commission concludes that joint expenses are 
necessary, such expenses shall be paid by the Commission through contri-
butions mnde by the Hiqh Contracting Parties in the form and proportion 
recommended by the Commission and approved by the Hiqh Contracting Partis~ 
10. The Commission may delegate the disbursement of funds for the joint 
expenses of the Commission. 
Article VII 
1. The Commission shall perform the following functions: 
(a) The Commission shall make recommendations to the High Contract-
inq Parties concerning scientific research for the purpose of 
studying the fishery resources in the sea aree.s of mutual 
interest and concerning control measures within the joint con-
trol zones to be carried out on the basis of the results of 
such research and study; 
(b) The Commission shall make recommendations to the High Contract-
ing Parties on the scope of the joint resources survey zones; 
(c) When it is deemed necessary, the Commission shall review matters 
concerning provisional fishery control measures and make recom-
mendations to the High Contracting Parties concerning measures 
to be taken as a result of such review (including the revision 
of the provisional control measures); 
(d) The Commission shall review necessary matters concerning safe 
operations and order among the fishing vessels of the High Con-
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tracting Parties and general policies for settling accidents 
occurring at sea between the fishing vessels of the High Con-
tracting Parties, and shall make recommendations to the High 
Contracting Parties concerning measures to be taken as a result 
of such review; 
(e) The Commission shall compile and study data, statistics, and 
records which the High Contracting Parties submit at the re-
quest of the Commission; 
(f) The Commission shall consider and make recommendations to the 
High Contracting Parties concerning the enactment of schedules 
of equivalent penalties for violations of this Agreement; 
(g) The Commission shall submit annually its business report t o the 
High Contracting Parties; and 
(h) The Commission shall study the various technical questions 
arising in connection with the implementation of this Agree-
ment, and shall, when it is deemed necessary, make recommenda-
tions to the High Contracting Parties on the steps to be taken. 
2. The Commission may establi s h such subsidiary organs as it deems 
necessary for the performance of its functions. 
3. The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall respect to the 
extent possible the recommendations made by the Commission in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1. 
Article VIII 
1. The High Contracting Parties shall take measures as may be appro-
priate to guarantee the observance of international practices concerning 
navigation by their nationals and fishing vessels, to promote safe 
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operations between the fishing vessels of the High Contracting Parties, 
to maintain proper order among them, and to achieve smooth and speedy 
settlements of accidents arising at sea between the fishing vessels of 
the High Contracting Parties. 
2. In order to achieve the objective of paragraph 1, the authorities 
concerned of the two High Contracting Parties shall maintain as closely 
as possible mutual contact and cooperation. 
Article IX 
1. Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled 
primarily through diplomatic channels. 
2. Any dispute which cannot be settled under the provision of paragraph 
1 shall be submitted for decision to an arbitration commission of three 
arbitrators; one to be appointed by the Government of each High Contract-
ing Party within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt by the 
Government of either High Contracting Party from that of the other High 
Contracting Party of a note requesting arbitration of the dispute; and 
the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen or to be 
nominated by the Government of a third power as agreed upon by the two 
arbitrators within a further period of thirty days. However , the third 
arbitrator must not be a national of either High Contracting Party. 
3. If, within the periods respectively referred to, the Government of 
either High Contracting Party fails to appoint an arbitrator, or the 
third arbitrator of the third nation is not agreed upon, the arbitration 
commission shall be composed of one arbitrator to be nominated by the 
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Government of each of two nations respectively chosen by the Government 
of each High Contracting Party within a period of thirty days, and the 
third arbitrator to be nominated by the Government of a third power 
decided upon by agreement between the Governments so chosen. 
4. The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall accept 
decisions rendered by the arbitration commission established in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article. 
Article X 
1 • The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of rat-
ification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. This Agree-
ment shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of 
ratification are exchanged. 
2. The present Agreement shall continue in force for a period of five 
years and thereafter until one year from the day on which a High Con-
tracting Party shall give notice to the other High Contracting Party of 
an intention to terminate the Agreement. 
In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by the res-
pective Governments, have signed the present Agreement. 
Done in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the 
year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese and Korean 
languages, each text being equally authentic. 
For Japan 
Etsusaburo Shiina 
Shinichi Takasugi 
For the Republic of Korea 
Tong Llun Lee 
Dong Jo Kim 
ANNEX 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPU3LIC OF KOREA 
CONCERNING FISHERIES 
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The provisional fishery control measures prescribed under Article 
III of this Agreement shall apply to each High Contracting Party and 
shall be as follows: 
1. The maximum number of fishing vessels or fishing units (that is, 
the maximum number of fishing vessels or fishing units carrying certif-
icates and bearing identification markings which at the same time engage 
in fishing operations within the joint control zones) shall be: 
( 
(a) Dragnet fishing by fishing vessels of less than 50 tons - 115 
vessels; 
(b) Dragnet fishing by fishing vesse~s of not less than 50 tons 
(i) during the period November 1 to April 30 - 270 vessels, 
(ii) during the period May 1 to October 31 - 100 vessels; 
(c) Surrounding net fishing 
(i) during the period January 16 to May 15 - 60 fishing units, 
(ii) during th e period May 16 to January 15 - 120 nshing units; 
(d) Mackerel fishing by fishing vessels of not less than 60 tons -
15 vessels; however, the fishing period shall be June 1 to 
December 31, and the fishing operation area shall be the waters 
south of a straight line drawn from a point where the border-
line between Kyongsang-pukto and Kyongsang-namdo of the 
Republic of Korea intersects the coastal line and 35°30 1 N, 
130°E (however, on the western side of Cheju Island, waters 
south of 33°30 1 N). 
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(e) During the period in which there is a difference between the 
fish-catching capability of Japanese fishing vessels and that 
of the fishing vessels of the Republic of Korea, the number of 
fishing vessels or the number of fishing units of the Republic 
of Korea shall be adjusted through consultation between the 
Governments of the two High Contracting Parties, using the 
maximum number of fishing vessels or fishing units prescribed 
in this Agreement as a standard, taking into consideration the 
aforementioned difference. 
2. Size of fishing boats: 
(a) Dragnet fishing -
(i) vessels other than those engaged in trawl fishing - not 
less than 30 t ons, but not more than 170 tons; 
(ii) trawl fishing vessels - not less than 100 tons but not 
more than 550 tons. 
However, dragnet fishing by vessels of not less than 50 tons 
(with the exception of dragnet fishing for shrimp in the Japan 
Sea by vessels of le s s than 60 tons, which is permitted by the 
Republic of Korea) shall not be permitted in waters east of 
0 128 East. 
(b) Surrounding net fishing - not less than 40 tons but not more 
than 100 tons; 
However, the one surrounding net fishing vessel of not less 
than 100 tons which existed in Japan on the date of the signing 
of this Agreement shall be permitted to operate, as an exceptim, 
for the time being. 
(c) For mackerel fishing by fishing vessels of not less than 60 
tons, the vessels shall not exceed 100 tons. 
3. Mesh size 
(a) For 
the 
( b) For 
the 
( C ) For 
mesh 
than 
(diameter of the 
dragnet fishing by 
mesh size shall be 
draqnet fishing by 
mesh size shall be 
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inner side when in sea water): 
fishing vessels of less than 50 tons, 
not less than 33 millimeters. 
fishing vessels of not less than 50 tons, 
not less than 54 millimeters. 
dragnet fishing mainly for horse mackerel or m;:1ckerel, the 
size of the main part of the fishing net shall be not l
ess 
30 millimeters. 
4. The brightness of a fish-luring light (capacity of all power gen-
erators): 
(a) For surrounding net fishing, the total brightness sh2ll not 
exceed 27.5 kilowatts per fishing unit consisting of two light 
ships with a capacity not exceeding 10 kilowatts each and one 
light ship with a capacity not exceeding 7.5 kilowatts. 
(b) For mackerel fishing by fishing vessels of not less than 60 
tons, the brightness shall not exceed 10 kilowatts. 
5. Certificates and identification markings: 
(a) Fishing vessels which operate in the joint control zones shall 
carry certificates issued by their respective governments and 
shRll bear identification markings. However, in the case of 
fishing vessels engaged in surrounding net fishing, vessels 
other than the net ship are not required to carry certificates, 
and the net ship shall display the principal marking while 
vessels other than the net ship shall display subsidiary 
markinqs which correspond with the principal marking. 
(b) The total number of certificates and markings (regarding fish-
ing vessels engaged in dragnet fishing and mackerel rishing, 
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the two m~rkings which each fishing boat displays shall be 
countered as one, while in the case of fishing vessels engaged 
in surrounding net rishing, tne two markings displayed by the 
net ship shall be counted as one) shall be the same as the 
maximum number of fishing vessels and fishing units for each 
type of fishing, as specified separately under the provisional 
fishery control measures. However, depending on the actual 
fishing conditions, the number of issuances (of certificates 
and markings) may exceed the prescribed maximum number of 
fishing vessels by 15 percent in the case of dragnet fishing 
by fishing vessels of not less than 50 tnns and by 20 percent 
in the case of dragnet fishing by fishinq vessels of less 
than 50 tons. 
(c) The form of the marking and the position for its display shall 
be determined through consultation between the Governments 
of the two High Contracting Parties. 
(The following documents, relating to the Japan-
Korea Agreement Concerning Fisheries and contain-
ing additional agreements of the Parties, have 
been omitted: Agreed minute on certificates and 
markings of vessels, total fish catch limits, 
enforcement of fishery control measures, Joint 
Fisheries Commission, Arbitration Commission, 
mutual respect of domestic fishing ban areas, 
emergency rescue and emergency refuge; and ex-
changes of notes on Korea's use of straight 
base lines, Korea's fishing zones, identifica-
tion markings of vessels, operation of vessels 
and exchange of information.) 
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MAP OF FISHERIES REGULATION ZO~E 
KOREA 
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PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ADJACENT SEAS 
18 JANUARY 1952 
U.N. Docs. ST/LEG/SER.8/6 (1957) 
and ST/LEG/SER.B/8 (1959) 
Supported by well-established international precedents and urged 
by the impelling need of safeguarding, once and for all, the interests 
of national welfare and defence, the President of the Republic of Korea 
hereby proclaims: 
1. The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises the 
national sovereignty over the shelf adjacent to the peninsular and 
insular coasts of the national territory, no matter how deep it may be, 
protecting, preserving and utilizing, therefore, to the best advantage 
of national interests, all the natural resources, mineral and marine, 
that exist over the said shelf, on it and beneath it, known, or which may 
be discovered in the future. 
2. The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises the 
national sovereignty over the seas adjacent to the coasts of the peninsular 
and islands of the national territory, no matter what their depths may 
be, throughout the exten s ion, as here below delineated, deemed necessary 
to reserve, protect, conserve and utilize the resources and natural 
wealth of all kinds that may be found on, in, or under the said seas, 
placing under the Government supervisions particularly the fishing and 
marine hunting industries in order to prevent this exhaustible type of 
resources and natural wealth from being exploited to the disadvantage of 
the inhabitants of Korea, or decreased or destroyed to the detriment of 
the country. 
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3. The Government of the Republic of Korea hereby declares and main-
tains the lines of demarcation, as given below, which shall define and 
delineate the zone of control and protection of the national resources 
and wealth on, in, or beneath the said seas placed under the juris-
diction and control of the Republic of Korea and which shall be liable 
to modirication, in accordance with the circumstances arising from new 
discoveries, studies or interests that may come to light in future. The 
zone to be placed under t he sovereignty and protection of the Republic 
of Korea shall consist of seas lying between the coasts of the peninsular 
and insular territories of Korea and the line of demarcation made from 
the continuity of the following lines: 
a• 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
From the highest peak of U-Am-Ryung, Kyung-Hung-Kun, Ham-Kyong-
Pukdo to the point (42°15 1 N - 130°45 1 [); 
From the point (42°15 1 N - 130°45 1 [) to the point (38°00 1 N -
132°50 1 [); 
From the point (38°00 1 N - 132°50 1 [) to the point (35°00 1 N -
130°00 1 [); 
From the point (35°00 1 N - 130°00 1 [) to the point (34°40 1 N -
129°10 1 E); 
From the point (34°40 1 N - 129°10 1 [) to the point (32°00 1 N -
127°00 1 [); 
From the point (32°00 1 N - 127°00 1 [) to the point (32°oo•N -
124°00 1 [); 
From the point (32°00 1 N - 124°00'E) to the point (39°45 1 N -
124°00 1 [); 
From the point (39°45 1 N - 124°00'E) to the western point of 
Ma-An-Do, Sin-Do-Yuldo, Yong-Chun-Kun, Pyungan-Pukdo: 
i. From the western point of Ma-An-Do to the point where a straight 
line drawn north meets with the western end of the Korean-
Manchurian borderline. 
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4. This declaration of sovereignty over the adjacent seas does not 
interfere with the rights of free navigation on the high seas. 
NO . 1 FISl~ERY RESOURCES CONSERVATION LAW NO. 298 
Article I 
Promulgated 12 December 1954 
U.N. Docs. ST/LEG/SER.8/6 (1957) 
and ST/LEG/SER .B/8 (1959) 
The seas lying between the coasts of the peninsula and insular 
territories of Korea and line of demarcation made from the continuity 
of the lines mentioned hereunder are hereby defined as the jurisdictional 
water for the conservation of the fishery resources (hereinafter referred 
to as the jurisdictional water). 
a. Line from the highest peak of U-Am Ryung, Kyung-Hung-Kun, 
Ham-Kyung-Pukdo to the point of (42°15 1 N - 130°45 1 E). 
b. Line from the point of (45°15 1 N - 130°45 1 E) to the point of 
(38°00 1 N - 132°50 1 E). 
c. Line from the point of (38°00 1 N - 132°50 1 E) to the point of 
(35°00 1 N - 130°00 1 E). 
d. Line from the point of (35°00 1 N - 130°00 1 E) to the point of 
(34°40 1 N - 129°10'E). 
e. Line from the point of (34°40 1 N - 129°10 1 E) to the point of 
(32°00 1 N - 127°D0 1 E). 
f. Line from the point of (32°00 1 N - 127°00 1 E) to the point of 
(32°00 1 N - 124°00 1 E). 
q. Line from the point of (32°00'~ - 124°DD'E) to the point of 
(39°45 1 N - 124°D0 1 E). 
h. Line from the point of (39°45 1 N - 124°00 1 E) to the western 
point of Ma-An-Do, Sin -80-Yuldo, Yong-Chung-Kun, Pyung-An-Pukdo. 
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i. Line from the western point of Ma-An-Do to the point where a 
straight line drawn north meets with the western end of the 
Korean-Manchurian borderline. 
Article II 
Any person who desires to engage in fishing in the jurisdictional 
water is required to obtain a permission from the competent Minister. 
Article III 
Any person who violated the preceding Article shall be punished by 
a penal servitude or an imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by a 
fine not exceeding five hundred thousand Hwan, and any fishing vessel, 
equipment, catch, and cultured and manufactured product which are owned 
or possessed by such person shall be confiscated. 
Article IV 
In the search for the offence provided in the preceding Article, the 
officers and sailors aboard Naval Vessels, and other officials determined 
by Presidential Decree may carry out the functions of the judicial police 
officers. 
In conducting the search provided in the preceding paragraph, they 
may, if necessary, bring home any vessel which violated the provisions 
of this Law. 
If a vessel excites suspicion of violating Article II, they may halt, 
visit, search and make any other necessary disposition of a vessel, even 
if such vessel is only a vessel in transit. 
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Supplementary Regulations 
A permission, licence or notice in force on 19 February 1952 shall 
be regarded as if it were obtained in accordance with this Law. 
This Law shall become effective on the day of its promulgation. 
NO. 2 REGULATION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
FISHERY RESOURCES CONSERVATION LALl NO. 298 
Promulgated as Presidential Decree No. 861 on 18 January 1955 
Article I 
U.N. Docs. ST/LEG/SER.B/8 (1959) 
and A/CONF. 13/27 (1958) 
The term "fi s hing" as used in Article II of the Fishery Resources 
Conservation Law (hereinafter referred to as the Law) means fisheries 
provided for in Articles VIII, XII of the Fishery Industry Law including 
fisheries for which licence has been given in accordance with Article 
XIII of the same Law. 
Article II 
In granting fishing licences the competent Minister shall give such 
consideration that these licences may not exceed the number of the per-
missible cases that had been dealt with up to the date of 19 February 1952 
except cases as limited in number by the Fishery Industry Law for the 
purpose of cultivating and conserving the marine fauna and flora in the 
jurisdictional water. 
Article III 
Any person who desires to obtain a permission for fishing shall file 
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application for permission with the competent Minister through the 
Mayor of the Special City or Provincial Governor in compliance with the 
provisions of Articles IX and X of the Regulations ot the Enforcement of 
the Fishery Industry Law. 
Article IV 
The fishery supervisors of the Government pursuant to the provisions 
of Article LVIII of the Fishery Industry Law and Article LI of the Regu-
lation for its enforcement shall exercise the functions of the judicial 
police officers provided for in Article IV of the Fishery Resources 
Conservation Law, providing that they are designated to do so under 
Article LX of the Fishery Industry Law. 
Supplementary Rule 
This Hegulation shall come into force from the date of the prom-
ulgation of the Fishery Resources Conservation Law. 
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